

JPRS 75098

8 February 1980

Vietnam Report

No. 2170



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	1. REPORT NO. JPRS 75098	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle VIETNAM REPORT, No. 2170		5. Report Date 8 February 1980	
7. Author(s)		8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No. 11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above		13. Type of Report & Period Covered 14.	
15. Supplementary Notes			
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains press and radio coverage on military, political, sociological, economic, and technical developments in Vietnam.			
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors VIETNAM Military Sciences Political Sciences Sociology Economics Culture (Social Sciences) Ethnology Technological Sciences b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms c. COSATI Field/Group 2, 5C, 5D, 5K, 06, 15			
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED 20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 67 22. Price

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPORTANCE OF GOOD FRONT-LINE LIVING CONDITIONS EMPHASIZED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] No 9, Sep 79 pp 53-59

[Article by Nguyen Lieu: "Organize the Lives of Front-Line Troops"]

[Text] The front-line troops are forces at the echelon which normally has the highest state of combat-readiness in the nation. Whether stationed at the northern border on the coast, or on islands, the front-line troops normally live in an environment with difficulties regarding weather, terrain, communications and transportation, supply, etc., which are greater than in many other areas. Therefore, in addition to its common characteristics, the organization of the front-line troops' lives with regard to messing, living quarters, and sanitation has its special characteristics and requirements and necessitates appropriate measures. Recently, many units on the front line have overcome difficulties and done a good job of organizing living conditions and assuring the messing, living quarters, and sanitation of the cadres and men. However, there are also units which have allowed the messing and living quarters situation to become untidy and have not paid attention to improving the living conditions of the cadres and men, which has created an adverse influence on the troops' health and their maintenance of a combat-ready way of life.

The actualities of combat readiness and combat against the Chinese aggressor troops in the northern border provinces resulted in a number of experiences regarding the task of organizing the lives, and assuring the messing, housing, and sanitation, of the front-line troops.

1. Strengthen the sense of responsibility of the leadership, command, rear-services, and mass organizations, and of both the upper echelons and the base-level units, in order to improve the troops' living conditions.

Whether in large units or small units, and whether at the upper echelon or at the base-level unit echelon, the party committees and unit commanders have the principal responsibility in leading and organizing the lives of the people.

There have been party committees which, although busy with many tasks, have still resolutely adopted the policy of setting aside time to conduct seminars and have assigned to the commanders and organs responsibility for holding seminars on organizing the messing, living quarters, and sanitation of the

cadres and men, to discuss in detail such measures as salting vegetables, pressing eggplants, and water storage, to assure that the troops will not have to eat boiled wheat flour, will not have to sleep outdoors in the heat and mist or sleep on the ground, etc. Unit X was dispersed on many islands, at many strongpoints, and in many areas. The forces in each place were small--sometimes committee and command cadres participated in actual organization and guided the rear-services cadres and organs in calculating, adjusting, and arranging cooking personnel, and in organizing kitchens, in a flexible manner, organizing them on a company, platoon, or squad scale, depending on the situation. Every kitchen served a fresh meal every week and increased both quantity and quality. Unit Y, operating the mountains-and-jungle area, encountered many difficulties regarding the supplying of nonstaple food and other aspects. The unit's commander continually inspected its cooking and nonstaple food processing and observed and supervised the troops' messing, living quarters, and sanitation even during the daily shift changes, etc. Although its operating conditions were difficult, the unit's organization of living conditions went smoothly.

Actuality has demonstrated that wherever and whenever the party committees and command cadres manifest a sense of responsibility, pay adequate attention, meticulously organize implementation, developed the staff and specialized roles of rear-services cadres and personnel, and are able to mobilize the masses to work together with them, there are certain to be transformations and improvements in organizing living conditions.

Of course, there must be decentralization, according to functions, between the upper echelon and the lower echelon, and there must be a division of labor between the command cadres and the rear-services cadres and between the commanders and the organs, so that there may be clear responsibilities in taking care of the troops in all regards, from supplying, storing, and managing foodstuffs to organizing messing, living quarters, sleeping, resting, sanitation, and disease-prevention on a daily basis. In all cases, all instances of untidy messing, living quarters, and sanitation, and of a decline in the troops' health, must be strictly investigated and responsibility must be assigned to a sector, echelon, or person in order to, by that means, promptly struggle against and overcome such phenomena and not prolong them.

In the final analysis, the organization of the cadres' and men's messing, living quarters, and sanitation is manifested specifically in the base-level units. Therefore, the base-level cadres must strengthen their sense of responsibility and continually gain experience in order to organize the living conditions of the cadres and men as well as possible. But the upper echelons must be concerned if the base-level units are to do a good job of organizing the troops' messing, living quarters, and sanitation. With regard to the front-line troops, the base-level units, especially battalions, companies, and platoons, are continually stationed on the battlefields and at the strongpoints. Therefore, in order to develop the role of the leadership organizations and command cadres in the base-level units, recently many places have guided the deputy battalion and company commanders in charge of rear services with regard to improving the troops' messing, living quarters,

sanitation, and disease prevention. They were strengthened with regard to their sense of responsibility and specific organizational methods. In fact there are cadres who, although very positive and animated, lack knowledge, do not know how to do their work, and are not accustomed to looking after others, so often there are many tasks waiting to be done but some people have nothing to do, and it is impossible to do a good job of organizing the unit's living conditions.

In developing the role of the rear-service organizations in the base-level units, it is necessary to pay attention to perfecting all three aspects of rear services: management, supplying, and the squad leaders serving as cooks. Such cadres must not only have a strong sense of responsibility and go all-out to serve the units but must also know how to do their jobs; they must be both diligent and creative. It is necessary to strengthen, organize, and adjust the medical assistant and physician forces and assure that there are the minimum forces necessary to provide care, prevent illness, and treat illness in the units and companies. With regard to female units, it is especially necessary to pay attention to training and assigning female nurses and medical aides in order to facilitate medical examinations and medical treatment. Those are common problems of leadership, command, and the personnel and rear-services organs at the various echelons.

Due to the special characteristics of the combat-readiness mission and the terrain conditions of the jungle-and-mountain regions and the islands, the front-line troops ordinarily must serve in many different areas and in many different defensive zones, strong points, and front-line positions. Therefore, merely going to each battlefield and strongpoint to control the deployed formations of the unit requires that the command cadres at the regimental and division echelons must overcome many difficulties regarding time, health, and planning. Therefore, only with a very strong sense of responsibility and with a working manner that is very scientific and meticulous, without fearing difficulty and hardship, can the command cadres have thorough knowledge of all aspects of the unit's activity and inspect, encourage, teach, and guide the good organization of the cadres' and men's messing, living quarters, sanitation, and disease prevention of the cadres and men. The commanders must, by means of education and actual organization, stabilize and normalize the daily activities of the cadres and men at the combat-ready positions of each person and unit, and enable everyone and all units to feel that "being on the battlefield is like being at home," be at ease, and be capable of remaining there to fight. We must overcome temporary "anything goes" attitudes, partialism, lack of consciousness of collective mastery, and the attitude that since the unit will not be in a place for long it is not necessary to spend much time on it, and when it leaves it demolishes everything, which creates difficulties for recently arrived units.

2. Prepare sufficient food and medicine to do a good job of organizing the living conditions of the front-line troops in the immediate future and in the long range.

Organizing the living conditions of the front-line troops is not only an immediate task while they are in a combat-ready status, but is also a matter of long-range preparation so that when they enter into combat the front-line units' messing and sanitation can be maintained from the very first battle and under the conditions of continuous fighting. Therefore, in addition to fully meeting the needs of daily life at the combat-ready positions it is necessary to stock food and water in the defensive zones and on the battlefield so that the troops can remain there for long periods and fight continuously, and will not have to withdraw from the battlefield because they lack food and water and must go hungry and thirsty for a prolonged period. The good preparation of food and medicine is a very basic aspect of the task of preparing for combat. It is one of the factors creating a solid defensive status.

That is a common concern of all echelons, including the strategic rear services, campaign, and combat echelons. It demands that all rear services study food processing in order to have dry staple and nonstaple food which is easily carries, easily stored, and convenient to use during combat, to supply to the front-line units. From the divisional level on up there must be a division of labor and decentralization in order to create rational stockpiling echelons, and prepare a road network and transportation and supply facilities in order to augment and supply the lower-echelon units at the front under the various circumstances. The provinces along our country's northern border are in a jungle-and-mountain area. There, the economic level in general and communications and transportation specifically are not as highly developed as in the lowland, and capabilities for on-the-spot supply capabilities are limited. A rainstorm can block roads. The humid climate causes stored goods to rapidly mildew and deteriorate. The districts and villages on islands cannot easily communicate with the mainland. In addition to the above characteristics and difficulties, it is also possible to encounter difficulties caused by sabotage and harassment by the enemy, especially after fighting breaks out.

Therefore, doing a good job of stockpiling, defending, and storing, and assuring that supplying and augmentation is continuous, according to plan, and uninterrupted at the echelons at the division level and above, for the units deployed at the front under all circumstances is an extremely important part of the task of preparing food and medicine to assure the living conditions of the front-line troops. Experience has clearly shown that if there problem is not well resolved the goods in storage will mildew and deteriorate and will be unusable, or the rear echelon will have much food in storage but the units at the front will have to do without because it cannot be promptly transported to them. With good organization and good preparation, the troops on distant islands and in remote mountain regions can be supplied with fresh food, noodles, tobacco, soap, and the other essentials.

The base-level units--the regiments, battalions, and companies--must rely on both supplies from the upper echelon and local sources of supply, and in part on the crops and farm animals they raise. Because of the necessity to maintain combat readiness in each zone, each column, and each high point, a

a matter concerning the front-line troops that must receive attention is the necessity of stockpiling food, water, and medicine on the battlefield and at the strongpoints; it is necessary to do a good job of managing the stockpiled supplies, which may be used only when truly necessary, when ordered by the relevant command echelon; and it is necessary to regulate the daily use of foodstuffs in order to rotate stockpiled supplies.

In the stockpiling of foodstuffs, medicine, etc., transportation is extremely important. It is necessary to assure that the supplies delivered to the men on the battlefield in accordance with the stipulated standards and existing capabilities. We must not allow one echelon or another to overstock or hold back supplies as it sees fit. Supplies should not be allowed to "leak out" while in transit or while passing through intermediaries. Furthermore, each regiment, battalion, company, etc., must pay attention to managing supplies, especially with regard to local and unit stockpiles; they must not allow the supplies to become unusable or lost, or to be used arbitrarily, such as eating dry rations first, using cotton, bandages, and medicine wastefully, at the wrong time, in the wrong place, etc. If they know how to make calculations the units can maintain a constant level of ration consumption; when it eats one meal it must think of the next, and on sunny days it must think of rainy days. Our people often say, "if one lives by one's wits one is well-fed and warm." If every time it slaughters a hog or cow a company dries or salts the meat it can be used 3 or 4 days. That is also a positive method for regulating the use of foodstuffs, so that the unit will not have to eat well some days but other days eat only rice and salt.

Actuality has demonstrated that in order to assure their source of supply the units on the front line can and must create conditions for cultivation and animal husbandry, thereby contributing to improving their daily diet or augmenting the on-the-spot stockpiles.

Unit B has grown 10 square meters of greens per person, even in the areas where troops are concealed, around lean-tos and bunkers, on the edges of trenches, on the battlefield, etc. Some units stationed on islands have transported baskets of soil from the mainland to spread over gravel and rock in order to grow crops. Those are good experiences regarding the use of one's own strength to create conditions for improving its material living conditions.

3. Positively improve techniques, improve the organization of messing and living quarters, and improve the living conditions of the cadres and men.

Everyone can easily see that the front-line troops, more than those at any other echelon, are forces which directly come into contact with, and are the first to come to grips with, the aggressor troops; they must go all-out to annihilate the aggressor troops in their defensive zone, and resolutely hold the area assigned them. The front-line troops must have staying power in order to fight resolutely and continually over a period of many days, hold their ground under all circumstances, move rapidly, and carry out strong counterattacks and attacks against the aggressor troops. The units deployed

on the northern border are always directly governed by the severe conditions of the terrain and weather of the jungle-and-mountain region. The units occupy positions 300-500 meters above sea-level, and sometimes 1,000 meters above sea level, so during the day there are thick clouds and at night there is cold fog; there is a lack of water to drink, bathe, or wash clothes. The units in the valleys or in caves face heat and wind during the day, and the nights are cold. In some places it takes clothes hanging out to dry in the shadows several days or even weeks to dry. That is a convenient environment for skin diseases, and such conditions make people feel bad. The units on the coast or on islands, especially those on islands, always live with sandstorms and burning heat. Many difficulties are encountered in supplying the necessities from the mainland. Those conditions exert a considerable influence on the daily lives of the troops and may weaken the health of the cadres and men.

Therefore, it may be said that because of the combat and combat-readiness requirements, the severe natural conditions, and difficult supply conditions, we must make the greatest subjective efforts, limit and overcome the harmful effects of the objective circumstances, seek all ways to rapidly improve living conditions, and do a good job of organizing the messing, living quarters, sanitation, and disease prevention of the cadres and men on the front line. Of course, the improvement of living conditions cannot be separated from the actual objective conditions. But on the basis of our country's economic capabilities and conditions we must make the greatest possible efforts and take many practical steps to assure the health of the cadres and men, and assure a high ratio of healthy troops in the units.

Actuality has clearly demonstrated that if organization is good at the front line, the divisions and regiments can process wheat flour into baked bread or vermicelli, which the troops can eat more easily and eat all of their staple food rations. When the defensive deployment has relatively stabilized, the battalions and companies also have conditions for improving techniques, with appropriate measures. If a unit is good at organizing, when difficulties are encountered it will not be content with boiling wheat flour dumplings, which are often sour and crumbly, so the troops quickly grow tired of it and waste it. In the cantonment areas and the strongpoints, the troops can find sticks and bamboo to make platforms, find straw and leaves to make a shelter, dig drainage ditches, drive stakes, make embankments to keep out water, hang up plastic sheeting to keep water out of bunkers and trenches, etc., so that they will not have to lay in the heat, in the fog, on damp places, and on the ground, and can assure safety and sleep well after hours of tiring combat alert duty or training. It is not necessary to have houses of wood or brick; even in the jungle and along streams, if we pay attention to organization it is still possible to have good places to eat and sleep, and clean bathing and laundry areas for men and women.

Recently, although operating in jungles and mountains along the front line some units were still able to make soybean cakes in order to improve their diet. Some units processed ordinary food into unusual dishes so that the men could eat better. Many anti-aircraft units had to move around continually,

but because they studied the building of temporary housing and light lean-tos which are easily disassembled and assembled and are easy to transport, so the troops could have good places to sleep no matter where they were. In the detachments the men cut one another's hair, found bamboo poles, dug ditches, built roofs that collected rainwater in order to build up water stocks, etc. Such tasks as picking jungle greens to make soup, organizing rotating kitchen assignments, cleverly covering cooked rice and boiling water so the men will not have to eat cold rice or get thirsty, arranging time and taking turns bathing and washing clothes, sleeping, and resting on the battlefield, etc., were not strange but are very ordinary and familiar to our cadres and men. Their combat lives have demonstrated that the men have many capabilities and have made many initiatives in such tasks. The important thing is that the commanders must elicit initiatives and guide the masses in improving their own living conditions. It is also necessary to have sharp eyes and the necessary care to recognize what must be done and to mobilize and organize everyone to do them. The rear-services cadres and personnel must not only go all-out to serve their comrades and fellow unit members, but also be thrifty and resourceful in their specialized work.

4. Strengthen sanitation and disease-prevention activity and create a civilized way of life even under difficult, arduous conditions, in close combination with improving the troops' spiritual life.

Even under ordinary living and training conditions, in the sphere of the troops' messing and living quarters it is necessary to pay attention to sanitation, disease prevention, and creating a civilized way of life. With regard to the units on the front line, the tense activities of combat readiness and combat and the negative influence of the living environment can easily cause the troops to become weak and ill, so it is even more important to strengthen sanitation and disease-prevention activities.

Sanitation and disease-prevention activities are manifested in many tasks, such as providing clean food and drink, arranging orderly eating and sleeping places, haircutting, shampooing, bathing and laundering, countering lice, snakes, centipedes, ticks, and mosquitoes, preventing and treating skin diseases, etc. Whether in squads, platoons, or companies, and whether in assembly areas, places of troop concealment, defensive positions, or strong-points, such tasks must be carried out continually. With regard to such tasks, the difficult thing is not that there are no conditions for performing them but that they must be performed well. The civilized way of life of a revolutionary army, our people's armed forces, on the front opposite the enemy troops is to an important degree due to such tasks. It would be very incorrect to take the view that on the battlefield it is not necessary to be concerned with many tasks, that it is only necessary to get by day after day and month after month, that it doesn't matter how the troops eat, sleep, or live. That mistaken viewpoint is an important factor resulting in the situation of troops being allowed to eat, live, sleep, and rest in unsanitary, untidy conditions, which makes the activities and living conditions of the cadres and men temporary and haphazard, weakens their health, and makes them more susceptible to disease and less enthusiastic.

In combat, the material and spiritual lives of our cadres and men are closely interrelated and affect each other very strongly. Therefore, in the process of organizing good messing, living quarters, sanitation, and disease prevention it is also necessary to pay attention to morale activities in order to do a good job of organizing the living conditions of the cadres and men. It is necessary to teach and encourage the cadres and men to develop the fine qualities and traditions of the army, manifest a will of revolutionary offensive, and resolutely endure all sacrifices and hardships in order to be combat ready, fight victoriously, stand firm on the nation's front line, and strongly defend the homeland. Every cadre and enlisted man must always maintain the status of victors, of people who are the masters of their country and of their destiny, and must maintain an atmosphere of optimism, wholesomeness, and happiness in the unit in the face of all challenges. They must manifest a spirit of sharing hardships, assist one another, and achieve close cooperation in each individual unit and among the units all along the line. We must make all-out efforts to assure that the men always have books and periodicals to read and have paper with which to write letters, and there must be good mail service. All of those tasks affect the spiritual and material lives of the troops.

The above are lessons we have learned from experience and are the principal measures to be taken in organizing the material lives, and assuring the messing, living quarters, and sanitation, of the troops on the front line. Those lessons will be highly effective if they are applied positively, are tied in with one another, support one another, and are appropriate to each echelon. Therefore, if each unit on the front line, whether large or small, applies those lessons positively and creatively, good results can be attained in organizing and continually improving the living conditions of the cadres and men.

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CSO: 4209

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS BY LOCAL ARMED FORCES ANALYZED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] No 9, Sep 79 pp 65-71

[Article by Colonel Cao Phat and Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Hoan: "Offensive Campaigns By Local Armed Forces"]

[Text] During our people's anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, local people's war in Military Region 5 and all over the southern battlefield developed to a high point and contributed to the nation's victory over the U.S. aggressors and the achievement of the greatest feat of arms ever in the history of our people's opposition to foreign aggression. One of the local people's war formulas widely utilized on the Military Region 5 battlefield was offensive campaigns by the local armed forces.

That type of campaign did not exist at the beginning, when our people in the south were advancing from partial uprisings to a people's war against the U.S.-puppet neocolonial war of aggression. It gradually took form on the basis of the development of people's war and the local armed forces.

After the victorious uprising at Tra Bong in Quang Ngai Province in August 1959, the armed struggle of the ethnic minority groups in the mountainous western parts of the lowland provinces of Military Region 5 and in the Tay Nguyen region took a new developmental step. Local people's war began to take form. Our base areas in the mountain region were built up and consolidated.

Local people's war continued to develop in Military Region 5 between 1960 and 1962. The local armed forces became more and more mature. One or two infantry companies of local provincial troops were organized. There were one or two platoons of local troops in the districts. Militia and guerrilla forces were organized into teams or squads in many hamlets and villages.

In 1963 and 1964, in the high tide of mass uprisings, especially the simultaneous uprising during the last 6 months of 1964, we continued to conduct two or three activity cycles a year in the lowland provinces and in the Tay Nguyen region, shattered segments of the enemy's occupation system, and liberated more than a million people. On that basis, the local armed forces developed strongly. The provincial troops included an infantry battalion, one or two sapper units, a combat engineer unit, a reconnaissance

unit, etc. The district troops consisted of one or two infantry companies. Nearly all of the hamlets and villages had militia and guerrilla units and special assignment units. Many cities had self-defense and commando units.

With such strong and widely developed local armed forces, the problem that was posed was to create the greatest possible strength, annihilate increasingly greater numbers of enemy troops, win over and keep the people, maintain the initiative on the battlefield, create conditions for the main-force units to fight large annihilating battles, and contribute to developing the common offensive strategic posture of the entire resistance war.

At that time, it was possible to operate on the Military Region 5 battlefield in accordance with two formulas. First there was fighting by "farming out;" i.e., on the basis of the mission assigned by the upper echelon the provincial military committee stipulated that within a certain period of time each district would have to kill a certain number of the enemy, capture a certain number of weapons, destroy a certain number of bridges, liberate a certain number of villages, etc. The provincial battalion would have to knock out a certain number of companies, destroy a certain number of armored vehicles, shoot down a certain number of airplanes, etc. Second, there was fighting of the "set piece" variety; i.e., on the basis of the mission assigned by the upper echelon and on our specific situation and that of the enemy, the provincial military committee organized small-scale and medium-scale campaigns, clearly determined the objectives and missions and the forces participating in the campaign, delineating the scope of the campaign and drafting the operational guidelines and plans, including the principal zone and the secondary zone of the campaign, the method of beginning the campaign, the method of setting up the key battles, and the objectives that must be annihilated or destroyed. After that it assigned cadres to prepare the battlefield and prepare forces, sent emissaries to oversee the key districts and villages, etc. After the fighting began and during the course of the campaign, the provincial military committee had to truly command and coordinate the campaign, and resolutely achieve the objectives, missions, and requirements that had been set forth.

The actualities of the Military Region 5 battlefield during the anti-U.S. resistance war confirmed that fighting in accordance with the first method is less effective, for such fighting will be scattered and cannot create combined strength; the enemy can concentrate forces to cope with ours in each area and paralyze our areas of operation. Only by fighting by the second method can we develop our greatest strength, cause the enemy to become confused and passive, and to be contested at the same time in many places, thus creating good conditions for us to annihilate large numbers of enemy troops and change the situation on the battlefield. Because of those requirements, in the spring of 1965 the offensive campaign of the local armed forces in Military Region 5 took form and gradually developed during the following years, until the victorious conclusion of the anti-U.S. resistance war.

In accordance with the operational policy of Military Region 5 during the spring and summer of 1965, the provinces took the initiative of launching many campaigns by the local armed forces. In Quang Da and Quang Nam, that type of campaign was effective in annihilating and disintegrating many of the enemy's local units, interrupting the enemy's communications, striking deep into the enemy's rear base areas, etc. Especially, the local battalion of Quang Nam Province inflicted heavy casualties on an infantry battalion of the puppet 3d Division at Moc Bai in Que Son District, thus forcing the puppet 2d Infantry Division to disperse its forces to cope with us, and were unable to reinforce Quang Ngai, which created conditions for the combined offensive campaign in Ba Gia District in Quang Ngai to win a great victory.

In the southern part of the Military Zone, the offensive campaign of the local armed forces of Phu Yen Province did a good job of fulfilling the mission of liberating the lowland countryside. The provincial battalions fought outstanding ambush battles and annihilated whole enemy companies in and around the fortifications in Tuy Hoa and Tuy An.

In addition to the high tide of simultaneous uprising in the lowland provinces, due to the close combination of the offensive campaigns of the Military Region's main-force troops, the combined offensive campaigns, and the offensive campaigns of the local armed forces, in accordance with the unified plan of the Military Region, we were able to create a greater combined strength than that of the enemy and, along with the entire south, defeated the "special war" strategy of the U.S. imperialists and forced them to become passive and hastily increase the number of U.S. combat troops in the south in order to carry out a new strategy, the strategy of "limited war."

During the period during which the U.S. was waging "limited war," even though the enemy had a great superiority with regard to air power, artillery, and armor, had a large number of troops, and had many modern facilities, by closely combining with the offensive and counteroffensive campaigns of the Military Region's main-force troops, the offensive campaigns of the local armed forces developed their effect, annihilated small and large segments of the U.S.-puppet manpower and destroyed many of their war facilities. That was very clearly manifested in the offensive campaigns of the local armed forces of Quang Da, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh provinces in 1966 and 1967. Although the level of ferocity of the war and destruction by the enemy increased, we still maintained the initiative on the battlefield and attacked the areas around the cities and the cities, such as during the 1967 autumn campaign, and therefore created favorable conditions for the activities of the soldiers and people of the Military Region in the general offensive and mass uprising of the spring of 1968, which won a great victory and contributed, along with the entire region, to defeating the "limited war" strategy of the U.S. imperialists.

From 1969 to 1971, although many difficulties were encountered the offensive campaigns of the local armed forces continued to maintain our battlefield position, annihilate a rather large number of enemy troops and war facilities, stop and set back their "rural pacification" plan, win and keep the people, and create conditions for the strategic offensive of 1972. In 1972 the

offensive campaigns of the local armed forces of the provinces in the Military Region, in coordination with the offensive campaigns of the main-force troops and the combined offensive campaigns, annihilated and disintegrated many of the enemy's local units, and liberated areas consisting of five to seven villages in the eastern part of Binh Son District in Quang Ngai Province, southern Binh Dinh Province, western Tam Ky District in Quang Nam Province, the area south of Da Nang, etc.

In the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975 the provinces of Military Region 5, coordinating with the offensive campaigns of the main-force troops at Buon Me Thuot and Hue-Da Nang, launched offensive campaigns by the local armed forces and, depending on the situation of the mass movement in each place, combined them with uprisings to annihilate and disintegrate the puppet army and administration. When the opportunity to completely liberate the south appeared the localities, cooperating closely with the main-force troops, liberated their own localities, carrying out the slogan "villages liberate villages and districts liberate districts," and contributed to, along with the main-force troops, creating a very rapid rate of advance and offensive strength with which to overwhelm and rapidly smash the enemy troops.

The great victory of the spring of 1975 once again confirmed the position, role, and great effect of the offensive campaigns of the local armed forces in the anti-U.S. liberation war for national salvation on the Military Region 5 battlefield.

The actual events on the Military Region 5 battlefield demonstrate that the offensive campaigns of the local armed forces must obey the common laws of the art of offensive campaigns, but that they have special characteristics which we must probe deeply in order to understand.

Offensive campaigns by local armed forces are the combined total of all battles by the local provincial troops, the local district troops, and the militia, guerrilla, self-defense, and commando forces, which ally with one another in accordance with a united intention and plan. In such campaigns the key battles are normally fought by the local troops. That type of campaign must be combined very closely with political struggle and military proselyting, and may include a number of mass uprisings. The campaigns usually took place in the sphere of one district of a province over a certain period of time and were directly commanded by the provincial military committee, which was under the direct leadership of the Provincial Party Committee. Their purpose was to fulfill the military and political missions assigned by the Military Region Command.

Offensive campaigns by the local armed forces, as their name implies, appeared because of many factors, but above all the local armed forces had to develop to a certain extent quantitatively and qualitatively. According to the experiences on the Military Region 5 battlefield during the anti-U.S. resistance war, there must be at least an infantry battalion of local provincial troops and the necessary number of fire-support units and combat arms (mortar, sapper, combat engineer, communications, and reconnaissance units).

There must be at least an infantry company of local district troops and militia and guerrilla forces, or special assignment teams that are organized in the hamlets and villages and self-defense and commando units in the cities. With regard to quality, they must experience a period of development, combat, and training under actual conditions, with emphasis on morale and combat will, techniques, tactics, organization and command, etc. Before the local armed forces have developed to that level, it is possible to use some main-force troops as fillers to perform missions of the local armed forces. If the local armed forces develop to a larger scale the province can, for example, have an infantry regiment or division and the necessary combat arms; the district can have an infantry battalion; and the villages and enterprises can have militia and self-defense companies and battalions. In that case, the scale and effect of the campaign will be greater. Local people's war takes form and develops on the basis of the development of the local political and military forces, and vice versa.

The local armed forces have the advantages of always being on the battlefield, being in continuous contact with the enemy, being familiar with the terrain, being able to rely on the great assistance of the people with regard to on-the-spot rear services, and not consuming much ammunition, so they are able to prepare the battlefield rapidly. In campaign art, secretly preparing the battlefield in order to achieve surprise is extremely important. Because of the above advantages, the local armed forces prepare the battlefield for offensive campaigns rapidly and effectively, keep their activities secret, and attack suddenly, before the enemy has time to react. Furthermore, due to rapid preparation they can carry out one campaign after another.

However, that is not to say that in preparing for campaigns the local armed forces do not encounter difficulties or do not have to be very meticulous and painstaking. Since the capabilities of the provincial and district troops are limited, and because they always have to engage in dispersed activities, when they are concentrated to launch a campaign truly good preparations must be made. The better the preparations are, the more effective the campaign will be.

The offensive campaigns of local armed forces are usually able to find the enemy's weak points, vital points, and openings; then, with small detachments, punishing and effective battles are fought and a high degree of combat effectiveness is attained. If such battles are fought without centralized control and arbitrarily their effect will be limited. But if they are carried out simultaneously and the enemy's weak points and vital points are attacked repeatedly in accordance with a unified intention and plan, in order to annihilate small and large segments of the enemy's manpower and war facilities and destroy supply dumps, airfields, bridges, etc., they will have greater effect. They will force the enemy to pull in forces which are on sweeping operations and further disperse other forces in order to fulfill defensive missions, and to always be afraid that they may be attacked. Therefore, we will be able to create a good opportunity to support the political struggle and military proselyting, or to stage uprisings to gain control of the people and the right of mastery, maintain the initiative on the battlefield, challenge the enemy, and coordinate with the other campaigns. The offensive campaigns of the local armed forces of the provinces in the summer and fall of 1965 and in the spring of 1972 proved that very clearly.

The main operational objectives of the offensive campaigns of the local armed forces during the anti-U.S. resistance war were such local forces as the enemy as the Regional Forces, the Popular Forces, and elements of the puppet regular forces which were assigned pacification missions. The specific objectives of each campaign were the enemy's principal local units in the area of operations we selected.

The goals of the campaigns were always to closely combine annihilating the enemy with winning control of the people, winning, the right of self-mastery, expanding the liberated areas, and developing our forces. The local armed forces, with many operational formulas, including the offensive campaign, are forces which continually come to grips with the enemy troops, are directly responsible for defeating one of the enemy's principal strategic measures in a war of aggression--pacifying and controlling the masses--so they must firmly grasp and effectively attain the goals of gaining mastery in order to annihilate the enemy and annihilating the enemy to gain mastery. Depending on the mission assigned by the upper echelon and the specific situation of the locality in each period of time, it is necessary to determine specific objectives which are appropriate for each campaign. But the tasks of winning and maintaining the people's mastership right, developing our forces, and annihilating the enemy are always intertwined. Only by winning the mastership right can we annihilate the enemy, and only by annihilating the enemy can we win and maintain the mastership right.

The offensive campaigns of the local armed forces always closely combine the small-scale annihilation and large-scale attrition of the enemy's manpower and war facilities in a large area. The large-scale attrition of enemy manpower over a large area and the destruction of many war facilities are intended to force the enemy to further disperse their forces, limit their mobility, and create conditions for small-scale annihilation battles. The good implementation of small-scale annihilation (the annihilation of enemy platoons and companies), especially the key battles in the campaigns, will shake up the battlefield and create conditions for winning control of the people and in the province. It is necessary to fully understand the concept of wiping out enemy squads, platoons, and companies. When there are opportunities for doing so, we should annihilate enemy battalions. The mission of fighting annihilating battles is fulfilled principally by local provincial and district troops. If local provincial and district troops are organized on a larger scale, the degree of annihilation will be greater and the significance and effect of the campaign will be greater. Therefore, in building local armed forces, in addition to building a broad militia, guerrilla, and self-defense network it is necessary to pay attention to creating local provincial and district forces with high combat quality. To lightly regard any aspect would be a mistake and could greatly impede the fighting and effectiveness of the campaign.

The offensive campaigns of the local armed forces always combine the military struggle with political struggle and military proselyting, but military struggle plays the main role and determines victory in the campaign. The offensive campaigns of the local armed forces on the Military Region 5

battlefield were all combined with political struggle, military proselyting, and a number of mass uprisings. Those activities had a great effect by contributing to the campaign's victory. However, in contrast to the combined offensive campaigns, those activities did not determine the campaign's victory. In combined campaigns, the armed forces and the political forces, and armed struggle and political struggle, all play a role in determining the results of the campaign. That point must be clearly understood, for it could create misunderstanding leading to the conclusion that all offensive campaigns of the local armed forces are combined offensive campaigns.

The offensive campaigns of the local armed forces always apply the operational guidance concepts of using few to defeat many, using the small to defeat the large, using high quality, to defeat large numbers, closely combining resolute bravery with creative intelligence, creating combat strength greater than that of the enemy, and finding many effective fighting methods of the armed forces and broad masses with which to annihilate the enemy. That requires that we have clever organization and implementation and that we closely combine the appropriate, effective combat forms and stratagems of the various kinds of forces: ambushing the enemy, surrounding them, and calling on them to surrender; fighting both widely scattered battles and concentrated, key battles; attacking the enemy both on the main line of resistance and in the rear; annihilating enemy manpower, destroying war facilities, attacking lines of communications, and cutting supply routes; using military attacks, political struggle, and military proselyting to annihilate the enemy and gain and maintain the right of mastery for the people, etc.

In order to do a good job of carrying out offensive campaigns by the local armed forces, the provincial military committee and the provincial command organ must be strengthened and have the necessary knowledge of the military line and art of our party, especially knowledge of campaign and tactical art. Only thereby can they organize, command, and manage all armed forces in the province in a flexible, resourceful, and creative manner, in order to resolutely create conditions for attaining the goals and requirements of the campaign.

Offensive campaigns, like the other kinds of campaigns of the local armed forces, are directly commanded by the provincial military command, under the leadership of the Provincial Party Committee, in accordance with a unified plan of the Military Region, and with assistance in all respects from the local people's committees, the sectors, and circles. Therefore, they are campaigns that have both a high degree of organization and a broad mass nature. They deeply reflect the strength of local people's war and the strength of the on-the-spot forces. That type of campaign was able to develop our strengths and win victory in the anti-U.S. resistance war, and is certain to prove highly effective in war to defend the homeland.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HISTORY OF HO CHI MINH TRAIL, TRUONG SON TROOPS DETAILED

Hanoi NGHIEN CUU LICH SU [Historical Studies] No 2, Mar-Apr 79 pp 22-33

[Article by Nguyen Viet Phuong: "The Truong Son Troops and the Ho Chi Minh Trail System"]

[Text] In the past, the units fulfilling the mission of supplying the battlefields in the south and in neighboring countries were called many different names: Line 559, the Corridor Route, the Truong Son Trail, the Quang Trung Transportation Unit, the Commo-Liaison Route, Group 559, etc. Now, in the various documents, we refer to them with the unified terms: the Truong Son troops and the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

However, no matter what we call them, we only regard them as an organization responsible for transportation along the Truong Son mountain range. But what did the Ho Chi Minh Trail consist of? What did the Truong Son troops do? What were their nature and roles in the recent anti-U.S. war for national salvation? For many reasons, in the past we were not able to disseminate such information. In 1973, the Secretary General of the Party, said after visiting the strategic Truong Son supply route that it was "... a path manifesting determination to win, bravery, and a revolutionary spirit. It was a path which connects the north with the south and unified the nation, a trail leading to the rich future of our homeland. It is a path which unites the peoples of the three Indochinese countries."¹

In order to demonstrate with relative sufficiency the significance of comrade L/2 Duan's remarks, we believe that it is necessary to deal with a whole series of topics; from the strategic plots, stratagems, and electronic warfare wizardry of the U.S. imperialists, our Party's strategic policy regarding the liberation of the south and absolute support for the revolutionary movements in Kampuchea and Laos, and our activities against the enemy's war of destruction, which was intended to achieve strategic interdiction, to topics related to society, ethnic groups, the soil, the severe weather conditions of the Truong Son, and the life of resolute combat of hundreds of thousands of outstanding people from the various regions of the homeland, who worked together there. In the scope of this article, we will present only some of the results of our research on the formation and organization of our strategic supply line in the anti-U.S. resistance war.

1. The Historical Circumstances of Birth, and the Basic Characteristics, of the Military Transportation Route on the Road Complex Bearing the Name of Uncle Ho

Following the Geneva Agreement, the U.S. imperialists feverishly promoted all activities to sabotage the revolutionary movement in Indochina, and plotted to transform it into an enormous military base and set up an anti-communist defensive line consisting of South Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea and connecting with Thailand. In the south of our country, the Saigon puppet regime violently launched a whole series of bloody terror campaigns in accordance with Diem's Decree 10-59, waged psychological warfare, and prepared to launch an aggressive attack against the north.

In that over-all situation, the revolution of the Indochinese people had to enter a new phase. By that time, the revolution of our people in the south was no longer able to struggle peacefully within the legal framework of the Geneva Agreement in order to unify the homeland. The Party Central Committee promptly issued Resolution 15, which clearly stated the strategic missions of both parts of our country and our international missions. It affirmed that "The developmental path of the revolution in the south is that of violence, and relies principally on mass forces combined more or less with armed forces, depending on the situation, in order to overthrow the rule of the imperialists and feudalists."

Under the light of the Resolution of the Central Committee, the revolution in the south developed to the phase of fierce struggle, to a broad revolutionary movement of seething simultaneous uprisings. The base area role of the socialist north was specifically confirmed as being to fulfill the supply mission with new contents.

Against that background, Route 559 (the initial name of the Ho Chi Minh Trail) was urgently established, in accordance with a resolution of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Part Committee,² in order to fulfill the mission of aiding the battlefields in the south and in the Indochinese countries. But it was established and organized at a time when the north, after a period of restoration, was still encountering many difficulties and in the world the situation was developing in a rather complicated manner, which exerted considerable influence on all supply activities of the Truong Son troops. At that time, on the southern battlefield the U.S. and their puppets utilized all schemes--terror, sweeping operations, population concentration, and the setting up of cleared zones. The Vietnamese puppets coordinated with the Laotian puppets to completely blockade the temporary military demarcation line. The Truong Son troops did not yet have experience in organizing military transportation routes, and the necessary factors for a strategic supply route to the front had not yet been prepared.

However, even when it was still called Line 559, the Political Bureau and the Central Military Part Committee affirmed that its responsibility and future role was: "A supply route for the south, for neighboring countries that is most basic and most important, and has extremely great immediate

and long-range strategic significance." That content was a synthesis of very different and very complicated missions: fighting the enemy in order to expand the liberated area in the Truong Son and create a strategic base area to serve as a base of support for our battlefields and those of our friends; preparing an "in place" area of operations to await for major opportunities to appear; organizing strategic supply transportation for the battlefields in southern Indochina; assuring strategic and campaign troop mobility; creating mass bases and local guerrilla war movements; organizing and assuring rear services, technical support, and fuel for themselves and for "guests" passing by; treating wounded and ill soldiers, acting as guides, issuing supplies, etc. Figuratively speaking, the Truong Son area was a buffer zone, a bridge connecting the rear area in the socialist north with the fronts. The Truong Son troops were an army organization which fulfilled strategic missions, and at the same time were a rear-services organization which was responsible for a whole series of very different named and nameless services.

Due to the variety and complexity of the missions in an area of thick jungles and mountains, far from the rear area, which the enemy attacked fiercely, heavily, and continually, everything became factors which directly affected all activities of the entire route. Throughout 16 years of combat, during the periods in which the Truong Son troops and the Ho Chi Minh Trail system developed from "have not" to "have" and from small to large and strong, there appeared basic characteristics which determined all of their activities. Of course, just after it was created and began operation we were not fully aware of those characteristics; only by means of its law-like positive and negative effects on all spheres of work did we reach the right conclusions. Those characteristics were:

1. That military transportation route lay between two enemy base networks which controlled the areas east and west of the Truong Son, and was in an area in which the U.S. imperialists freely experimented with all kinds and types of warfare and all sorts of modern electronic weapons, and utilized the various kinds of interdiction warfare to an increasingly greater degree.

2. The military transportation network had to pass through an area of thick jungles and rugged mountains; the weather was very severe, and the rain and mud lasted half a year. Those obstacles continually affected all aspects of the troops' work, combat, and lives throughout the route, and became "seasonal laws." Basic contradictions arose between the requirements of the difficult missions steadily increased in comparison to the limited contradictions, and were controlled by time.

3. Furthermore, the strategic military transportation route was long and wide, and passed through areas which were sparsely populated or unpopulated, so there were no on-the-spot material base organizations of society to meet the urgent needs during that fierce interdiction war. The Truong Son troops had to organize in "closed" forms in practically all tasks. There was a very great contradiction between the requirement of streamlined organization and an increasingly larger number of missions, which required a high degree of combat effectiveness.

4. The missions of the Truong Son troops differed greatly with regard to their nature and operational formulas. The Ho Chi Minh Trail, which connected the national rear area with the front line and served the liberation wars in the south and in the other Indochinese country, naturally became the point of confluence of manpower, material, and finances. Therefore, it increasingly drew the fierce attacks of the enemy, with their policy of "cutting the throat" and "punching a hole in the bottom" in order to completely stop the north's assistance to the south and the neighboring countries.

In brief, the four characteristics mentioned above were interrelated and had the effect of determining all aspects, from the organization of forces, the combat formula, and the implementation measures, to all aspects of technical support, the work and material and spiritual lives of the troops, etc. That explains the unique organizational form of the Truong Son troops, the combined combat nature of the strategic military transportation route, and the necessity of creating determination to defeat the U.S., defeat all severe circumstances, and strive to become a "four skills" army⁴, for only then could they fulfill the missions assigned by the Party.

II. Reviewing the Major Features of the Developmental Periods of the Truong Son Troops and the Ho Chi Minh Trail System (During the Anti-U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation)

From the time it was created to the end of the fight against the U.S., that strategic supply route passed through the major phases of the war. But with regard to strategic military transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, we can divide the war into four phases.

1. The first period (1959-1964).

"The birth and gradual formation of the initial organizations of the strategic military transportation route. Relying principally on the nonmechanized transportation formula; and advancing to combining it in part with mechanized transportation in each area on a small scale. Meeting the urgent requirements of the simultaneous revolutionary movement, and helping the soldiers and people of the south to defeat the special war of the U.S. and its puppets. Helping the Laotian revolution to struggle to win the people, build bases, and fight the enemy in order to expand and consolidate its liberated area."

In order to aid the war in the south, the Political Bureau had formed the "Unification" line. But when the revolutionary movement gradually became a liberation war there had to be a new military transportation route that could effectively serve the strategic policies of the Central Committee and victoriously attain the immediate objectives while preparing for future objectives.

Implementing the resolution of the Central Military Party, the responsible organ scoured the Military Regions and divisions to select a corps of

loyal cadres and men to carry out that great mission. After nearly half a year of study and selection, on 19 May 1959 we completed the formation of the first road transportation unit (called D.301), with 440 members. At the beginning of July 1959 we formed Sea Transportation Battalion 603, with 107 members. At the same time, organizations to receive cargo, repackage it, take off markings and labels, etc, also passed through the preparatory stage.

That transportation and supply organization was named Group 559. The assembly area of the land transportation unit was at Bao Ha Khe Ho in Vinh Linh, while the sea transportation unit assembled on the Gianh River. At that time, Group 559's command organ was still in the rear, but at the beginning of the route there was a corridor command committee, and command committees in charge of strategic areas were set up in areas tightly controlled by the enemy.

Because of compelling objective circumstances and subjective conditions, in the Truong Son area of operations it was necessary during the initial period to select the nonmechanized transportation mode, with a slogan of absolute secrecy--"go without leaving tracks, eat without making smoke, and speak without making noise"--in order to assure safety in all operations and carry out the minimum aid plan for the battlefield. But the most important matter was to establish the foundation for future development and create the preconditions for large operations in correct accord with the laws of advance of revolutionary war.

After a period of training, the Truong Son troops urgently set about a whole series of pressing tasks: grading roads, establishing stations from which to defend the roads and organizing back-pack and pack bicycle units to operate secretly.

During that period (1959-1960), the enemy continually launched sweeping operations, terror campaigns, and population concentrations, set up strategic hamlets, swept up the people, and established cleared zones. In April and May the enemy launched two sweeping operations into 39 hamlets north of Route 9. Our base was temporarily shattered. However, at by end of 1959 we were able to deliver the first cargo to the battlefield. In evaluating those initial results, the Party Committee of Group 559 later solemnly concluded that "although the volume at that time was still small, every weapon and every case of ammunition that was delivered to the soldiers and people of the south in that phase of transition to armed struggle was historically significant."

In the process of fulfilling their mission, the Truong Son troops always paid attention to gaining specific experience regarding the enemy's operational laws, our operational methods, and obstacles caused by nature, and promptly recommended to the Central Military Party Committee methods for overcoming those problems. Then the Central Military Party Committee permitted:

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The development of transportation battalions into transportation and road-building regiments.⁶

The improvement of purely nonmechanized transportation in combination, to a limited degree, with mechanized transportation.⁷

Faced with our development, the enemy were very bitter. They clamorously launched large sweeping operations from Cua Viet westward along Route 9. The most fierce of them was the Hoanh Son battle, when the U.S. sent in dozens of infantry battalion, along with reconnaissance forces, guard dogs, and bulldozers, to pulverize our troop movements and transportation. The High Command had to launch tactical campaigns to support the transportation. Military Region 4 quickly organized coordinated combat with the fraternal armed forces to resolutely attack the right-wing forces, eliminated a large number of their outposts along Route 9, and liberated large areas. Then the enemy were eliminated from Route 8 and Route 12, and the liberated area in Central Laos was connected with Lower Laos.

Taking advantage of those advantageous conditions, the High Command used airplanes to drop supplies onto the Sepon airfield to aid our Laotian friends. It also mobilized a whole infantry division to transport cargo directly into the interior, to support of the transportation route. At that time, the Rear Services General Department had to urgently select vehicles, select brave cadres and men experienced in mountain transportation, and organize them into brave companies to transport cargo to Route 9. With a whole series of such active measures, after the end of 1961 the Truong Son troops were assigned a volume of cargo nearly 20 times greater than in the past, and transported more than 10,000 men to supplement the battlefields.

By that time (1962-1963), the situation in the south of our country was no longer that of a half-war, but had become a liberation war to counter the U.S.-puppet special war. The Laotian revolution was also developing strongly, and in June 1963 the U.S. imperialists were forced to recognize the tripartite coalition government.

In view of that situation, an urgent problem that was posed was to increase mechanized transportation capabilities in order to meet the needs of the war. The Central Military Party Committee promptly decided:

To allow Group 559 to continue to maintain the eastern corridor, to urgently open a pack bicycle transportation route to the west, and to gradually abandon the eastern route.

To rapidly increase the troop strength, vehicles, and weapons of the Truong Son troops.

To boldly build motor roads and extend mechanized transportation to the peaks of the Truong Son.

The High Command also rapidly assigned military engineers to Group 559 in order to open new routes. The Truong Son troops also fully utilized the rivers flowing to the west and to the west in order to transport cargo.

After a period of operation good results were attained, and new capabilities appeared. The Central Military Party Committee authorized:

Studying the building of a road to Ta Xeng to connect with the rear area of the Tay Nguyen battlefield.

Urgently building a road to Nam Ngai in Khanh Hoa (by way of Cha Van and Dac Min).

Due to correct policies and many specific, prompt guidance measures, we were able to increase the capabilities of the Truong Son troops in order to enable the simultaneous uprising revolutionary movement to win a brilliant victory and smash the reactionary national policies of Ngo Dinh Diem.

For the enemy's part, after the Staley-Taylor plan was defeated, the U.S. imperialists came up with the MacNamara-Nguyen Khanh plan in the south, set up a tripartite coalition government in Laos, and implemented plan 34A (a plan of open military activities against the north). With regard to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan sought ways to force Phouma to allow U.S. planes to replace the Royal Lao Air Force in attacking and interdicting our aid. That began the period in which the Truong Son troops had to face even more fierce challenges and prolonged hardship in many ways. But our units overcame everything and concluded the 1964 transportation season--the last dry season of the first period--and increased the total number of supply transportation tons/kilometers 40-fold over previous years. Of that total, mechanized transportation accounted for 51 percent. Therefore, we were able to contribute positively to defeating a doctrine of the U.S. imperialists and began the large-scale development of the mechanized military transportation route so that it could be capable of serving the strategic decisions of the Party Central Committee.

2. The second period (1965-1968):

"Stressing the mechanized transportation mode, in combination with the nonmechanized transportation mode; flexibly applying the slogan attack, prevent, and evade, and defeating the enemy's interdiction war and brilliantly fulfilling the mission of providing large-scale aid to effectively serve the defeat of Johnson's new war doctrine." In 1964 and 1965 the liberation war in the south won very great victories. The U.S. imperialists were forced to change their strategy:

On 7 February 1965 the U.S. imperialists openly began a policy of escalating the war by air strikes against North Vietnam (in fact, on 4 August 1964 the U.S. had taken advantage of the "Maddox Affair" to begin attacking the north).

In March 1965, Johnson approved a plan for air force operations in Laos (carried out in two programs: "Steel Tiger" to attack the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and "Rolling Dragon" to attack central and northern Laos).

In view of those serious developments, the Party Central Committee promptly issued a resolution on the urgent situation and missions. It determined that "Our victories and the enemy's defeats have caused the U.S. imperialists' three principal sources of support in their war of aggression in the south--the mercenary army and the lackey puppets, the strategic hamlet system, and the cities--to collapse or be strongly shaken, which is becoming their major source of worry." The Party Central Committee especially stressed the "blood ties" between the north and the south, then affirmed that "It is necessary to positively provide large-scale aid to the south, at the highest possible level. The communications-transportation task must become one of the central strategic missions of the entire Party, the entire population, and the entire army in the phase of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation.

Implementing the Party's resolution, our entire transportation network, from the north to the battlefield, concentrated on building, repairing, and actively defending roads. The vehicle forces of the state and the army were mobilized to fulfill transportation missions, and prepared to take on cargo in the assembly areas and then cross the Truong Son. Many Assault Youth units were sent to the transportation routes to, along with the combat troops, build and defend roads.

With regard to Route 559:

It was necessary especially to urgently promote mechanized transportation, and to organize coordinated combat with many combat arms, with the truck forces serving as the center of coordination.

It would continue to open new roads to enter deeply into the southern battlefields, especially to the Tay Nguyen area and lower Laos, and assure a transportation volume 2.5 times greater than in 1964 (95 times greater than in 1959-1960). The forces moving along the route would also increase three-fold over previous years.

Faced with that new situation and mission, the military transportation route was developed, organized on a large scale equivalent to that of a Military Region, and divided into three routes.⁸ Its troop strength and facilities were more than doubled and the transportation troops received more than 1,000 new vehicles. With the arrival of the dry season, the entire nation began to noisily go to the front; the manpower and wealth of the entire nation were mobilized for the battlefield. Everything was sent via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which began at the intersection of Route 15

and Route 12--the door to the Truong Son. In order to support the Truong Son troops, the Rear Services General Department organized truck convoys to transport cargo directly from Hanoi to the battlefield.

The enemy "caught scent" of our strong development and immediately stepped up their air interdiction activities. During the dry season, the enemy sent 11,578 airplanes to attack us, which dropped 136,348 bombs (including only those which could be counted).

During the first year, our transportation troops ran up against the enemy's concentrated firepower and did not yet have experience in countering their large-scale attacks, so the roads were continually cut and we suffered much greater losses in the past. Furthermore, that year the heavy rains came early and the Seng Phan-Pha Nop area was flooded. Our transportation rate slowed down and cargo was held up in many places. All activities became very difficult. The health of the cadres and men seriously declined (in some units 50 to 60 percent of the men were ill).

In order to urgently step up transportation and create a true transformation, the commanders of the Rear Services General Department and the Political General Department made a first-hand inspection of Route 559 and resolved the key problems on the spot.

Thanks to the appropriate guidance contents of the Central Military Party Committee, and with the guidance of the General Departments, which went all-out to create favorable conditions for the Truong Son troops, within a brief period of time we had undergone an all-round rectification: with regard to organization, we abandoned the intermediate level, set up way stations to exercise combined command of the combat arms, and organized a corps of cadres capable of direct leading and commanding them. With regard to thought, we applied the concept of revolutionary offensive, which was expressed in the motto "Fight the enemy as you go, advance by opening roads, and do a good job of camouflage and concealment." The tendency to stress passive defense and evasion was severely criticized. With regard to operations, the Truong Son troops resolutely changed their working methods and style, and very seriously studied the enemy, the weather, the climate, and the hydrology, in order to, and took advantage of their beneficial aspects, in order to serve the strategic missions. Entering deeply into, in order to grasp very specifically, all of our activities, and promptly point out the strengths and weaknesses, the cadres directly went to the places with the greatest difficulties. With such truly resolute rectification, and with the entire route enthusiastically concentrating all activities on the principal objectives and creating new, combined strength with which to attack the objectives and repulse the opposing forces, within only a year we were able to build nearly 800 kilometers of motor roads in the Truong Son Mountains, and the anti-aircraft units which were organized to defend the roads in mountainous terrain fought the enemy effectively.⁹ Creatively applying our army's military thought and operational guidance principles to transportation, the Truong Son troops surpassed the

norm for cargo delivered to the battlefield by 126 percent and surpassed the norm for delivery cargo to our Laotian friends by 227 percent, thus assuring that troop reinforcements surpassed the plan by 53,000 people.

The Central Military Party Committee very highly valued those accomplishments of the Truong Son troops during the 1966-1967 dry season: "The Truong Son troops have strongly advanced and have overfulfilled their missions. In combat, our forces have outstandingly matured and manifested our army's tradition of becoming stronger as they fight. They have created a seething spirit of continually attacking in order to win victory."¹⁰

On the basis of the recent actual experience they had gained and transformed into operational rules, the Truong Son troops were able to defeat the enemy's attacks and greatly increased their capability to victoriously fulfill their missions, especially during the dry season of 1968, when the U.S. increased its air force activity twelve-fold (in comparison to 1965-1966). They increased their reconnaissance activities to 50,705 sorties,¹¹ and began to use electronic reconnaissance facilities. The U.S. Department of Defense ordered the use of a type of bomb which was highly lethal and increased the number of bombs dropped to 539,818. But in the end the U.S. bandits still could not stop the north's great, concentrated aid for the general offensive of the soldiers and people of the south during Tet of 1968.

The U.S. was also forced to concentrate even greater air strength and use electronic weapons in a big way. Johnson ordered the use of fragmentation bombs, magnetic bombs, trip bombs, delayed-action bombs, bombs which explode immediately, "leaf" mines, etc. With regard to tactical schemes, they applied the forms of concentrated attacks on strategic areas and the combined use of weapons with different capabilities to create gigantic fire-power traps and inflict casualties on relief forces in order to stop traffic for a prolonged period of time.¹²

When we were first struck by those strong blows, there appeared in our units some instances of vacillation. But thanks to the experience they had gained the Truong Son troops were able to rectify the deviation, promptly create a resolute fighting spirit, and creatively applied the lessons that had been learned: paying attention to building organization, combining combat arms at the waystation level, having combined combat command at each key position, especially forging the "four" directs" workstyle at all echelons, developing a transportation status with many routes and many directions. But above all it was necessary to manifest a spirit of mastery, of daring to accept responsibility, do big things, and attack, and to know how to develop the creativity of the masses in order to attack victoriously.

With a whole series of positive measures to combine the strength of the entire route, we won victories greater than those of any previous years. With regard to the central missions, we attained 108 percent of the transportation plan (the previous years plan was fulfilled by 131 percent and troop

movements by 130 percent). With regard to the task of assisting our friends, that year we won the outstanding victory of creating and consolidating semi-armed forces for our friends, with 45,998 guerrillas (including 10,415 women) receiving military training.

The end of 1968 was also the end of the limited war phase and the end of another doctrine of the U.S. President. At the same time, it also signified a great defeat of the U.S. imperialists' war to stop our strategic aid, and the enemy were forced to admit that "Throughout a period of 4 years the U.S. President mobilized the U.S. Air Force to the maximum but still could not prevent the enemy's supply activities from reaching the highest level ever."

3. The third period (1969-1973):

"Establishing three mechanized transportation modes: land routes, river routes, and pipelines. Stressing truck transportation. Forming divisions made up of many combat arms in each area. Serving our decision to defeat the U.S. imperialists' 'Vietnamization' strategic plot."

After the U.S. had to "deescalate" their war of destruction against the north, the Central Military Party Committee gave the following specific guidance to the Truong Son troops: "The choke-points from the rear area to Route 559 will be the focal points of concentrated, fierce attacks by the enemy. Therefore, beginning now the advance echelon of the Rear Services General Department must study ways to take cargo farther south, in order to shorten the route and reduce the difficulties so that Group 559 would be able to concentrate its guidance on the forward echelon. It was necessary to draft plans and increase forces and facilities for Route 559 so that it could fight to defend the roads and be strong enough to cope with the stratagems of the enemy, whether they used air power or concentrated infantry to attack and interdict our transportation route."¹³

Events occurred as expected. During the 1969 dry season the U.S. Air Force increased its B52 sorties against key objectives to 4,276 in 1969 and to 8,300 in 1971. In all, during that period Nixon mobilized 483,981 tactical sorties and 25,846 strategic sorties against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The U.S. Air Force Command ordered a campaign of interdiction at 23 key points, with the goal of wiping out the environment in those areas. They attacked each place for from 1 month to 180 days, with tactical aircraft coordinating with strategic aircraft. For example, 2,708 sorties were launched against Seny Pan, 2,108 sorties were launched against Ta Le, and 3,663 sorties were launched against Cha La; Se Bang Hien was attacked for 4 months, Nam Cong was attacked for 3 months, "pass 900" was attacked for 3.5 months, Vang Mu Tha Me was attacked for nearly 6 months, etc. During that period, the U.S. imperialists improved the AC.130 (normally a transport plane) and used it to interdict our convoys on the trail. Because it had night observation equipment, was able to operate for a long period of time, had a speed appropriate to truck hunting, and was equipped with strong firepower, the AC.130 created difficulties for our truck troops for a certain period of time.

In addition to their air activities, the U.S. imperialists stepped up their operations on the ground in three forms:

Dropping large numbers of commando groups to penetrate the jungle and, in coordination with landings by air, continually attack us.

Launching small-scale and medium-scale nibbling operations on the eastern and western flanks of the Truong Son, and penetrating the Ho Chi Minh Trail system.

Launching operations of from two or three battalions to five or six divisions, with the participation of the armed forces branches and combat arms. Exemplary of them was the "Lam Son 79" operation, with the "U.S. firepower plus puppet infantry" formula, in which they hoped to completely cut our strategic supply line.

For our part, because it quickly comprehended the Party Central Committee's strategic intentions in the new phase, the Central Military Party Committee approved a plan to improve the organization of the 559 battlefield to make it appropriate to the new situation and mission, so the entire route urgently changed from the form of "separation into individual waystations with combat command capabilities" to the form of "separation into large zones which organize and command transportation campaigns" in order to aid all battlefields.

The Truong Son troops, with considerable aid from the state and the all-out assistance of the General Departments, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms, were able to improve their organization while creating a new battlefield position strong enough to cope with the enemy and do things on a big scale. The principal contents were as follows:

With regard to developing land and river routes, they completed six "choke-point routes,"¹⁴ built many roads around the principal blocking positions, created a network of "secret roads," and combined secret transportation with "open roads" and open transportation to create an integrated, solid transportation network.

They eliminated rapids, improved channels, and built ports on the major rivers in order to increase the speed of motorized boats.

They built hundreds of thousands of air-raid shelters for people, vehicles, and guns operating along the route.

With regard to combat, supporting missile-equipped anti-aircraft regiments which were deployed to solidly defend the principal arteries and positions formed many layers of firepower to prevent the enemy airplanes from operating. Anti-aircraft units, working with infantry and military engineers, took their weapons to mountain tops, organized fake positions, placed objectives to bait the enemy airplanes, and when they arrived

suddenly concentrated firepower to annihilate or deceive the enemy, and force them to fly far from the main transportation routes.

Infantry battalions and regiments cooperated with friendly units prepositioned in the mobile zones to immediately intercept and smash the enemy's nibbling operations. They coordinated with the main-force divisions in smashing the U.S.-puppet strategic operations. At the same time, they continually tracked down and wiped out the commando groups which were making their way to the trail from east and west of the Truong Son.

In order to assure command of all activities on a road network nearly 20,000 kilometers long, at all locations, during all fierce combat circumstances, the forces were equipped with the various kinds of direct communications facilities so that they could support one another.

The transportation units readjusted their routes so that they could be appropriate, in order to exploit the operational capabilities of the mechanized facilities. To assure high effectiveness, we also made such major improvements as planning the creation of assembly areas and departure points of truck convoys; stations to supply fuel and give technical support en route; temporary rest areas and kitchens en route for the transportation troops, etc. Along the route, all segments had escort teams, traffic control teams, and emergency road teams.

In addition to organizing transportation formations with relatively stable routes, there were also transportation regiments which went straight on to the Military Regions. Fuel pipeline systems were continually extended from the rear area, across the mountains, and to the central zones of the strategic areas of operation.

With a deployment that formed a transportation "battlefield position" there, we were able to improve the combined strength of the combat arms, and to take advantage of the "advantages" regarding weather and terrain to attain the objectives of strategic aid. Therefore, although the U.S. bandits mobilized their maximum strength they could not stop the logistical support of the great rear area in the north for the great front line in the south. Especially noteworthy during that period was the fact that the Truong Son troops simultaneously fought the enemy and did a good job of serving four campaigns of decisive significance:

In 1970, they coordinated in fighting and transporting to serve the forces of the High Command and our Military Regions and those of our friends to smash the U.S.-puppet operation along Route 9 in southern Laos.

In 1972, with the all-out assistance of the state organs, the army, the people, and the party organizations of the northern provinces, the Truong Son troops effectively served the campaign to liberate Quang Tri, at a time when the U.S. President was implementing the strategy of blockading our coast and the lines of communication in the north.

In 1973, they coordinated with the Pathet Lao in fighting and in serving the offensive to liberate a large area in central and southern Laos, and helped our friends strengthen their base areas in all ways.

When that period ended, Group 559 had achieved such strategic results as:

With regard to annihilating enemy manpower, shooting down or damaging 1,689 airplanes and wiping out 10,342 of the enemy.

In fulfilling the central missions we surpassed the basic norms. We delivered to the battlefields a material and material-technical volume 4.5 times greater than during the second period (and 12 times greater than during the first period), and the total ton/kilometer norm increased 184 times.

In the above-mentioned victories, the basic success of the Truong Son troops was to create and perfect three mechanized transportation modes which were capable of large-scale operations and held much promise.¹⁵ There were created large-scale (regiment and division) transportation tactics, with close coordination between the elements and echelons. Nonmechanized facilities were used flexibly supplement, appropriately and effectively, mechanized transportation. There was created a military transportation position with the deployment of firepower with which to effectively fight the enemy (both in the sky and on the ground), and defeat the war of interdiction of the U.S. imperialists against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We created a strong position on the enemy's back in order to fulfill any mission, no matter how great, assigned by the party.

4. The fourth period (1973-May 1975):

"Urgently expanding the Ho Chi Minh Trail system, and creating a strategic area of operations. Organizing coordinating combat divisions, developing to a high degree the combined strength of the three mechanized transportation modes, going all-out to prepare "quickly, sufficiently, completely, and closely" all rear-area material needs of the battlefields, preparing to take advantage of major opportunities, and effectively serving the phase of strategic counteroffensive and offensive, liberating the south, and helping the Khmer revolution win ultimate victory."

After the Paris Agreement, the U.S. imperialists were forced to withdraw all foreign troops from the south, which completely changed the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy on the Indochinese battlefield. Especially, with regard to the Truong Son strategic area of operations, that presented the greatest opportunity ever, for:

Without the U.S., the puppet aircraft dared not strike deeply against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The puppet army had been subjected to large-scale annihilating battles when they still had the support of U.S. naval and air power, so now it dared not attack but had to remain behind its defensive lines.

The Saigon puppets dared use only some of their tactical aircraft to harass the roads in the vicinity of some high points south of Dac Pec, Dac Cong, and Plei Khoc, and send some commando teams to segments of the roads which were nearing and threatening them.

During that period, only two-thirds of the Ho Chi Minh strategic military transportation system were a non-combat area, while one-third was in an area that had to be combat-ready. But we were able to move in forces and concentrate firepower so that we had enough strength to overwhelm the enemy troops and create conditions for the Truong Son troops to carry out the strategic decision of the Party Central Committee: devoting all their capabilities to making large-scale, all-round preparations for the phase of strategic counteroffensives and offensives on all southern and Khmer battlefields. During that period they did a good job of performing the following important tasks:

Urgently guiding the drafting of a new plan to organize integrated strategic and campaign transportation networks. Boldly sending military engineer divisions and regiments up from the rear and urgently carrying out at the same time a whole series of tasks--surveying, planning, and building new roads, consolidating old roads, and building bridges to assure the movement of troops and heavy equipment. Extending the eastern branch close to the defensive lines of the Saigon army and extending the western branch to the Khmer and Laos battlefields in order to develop the strategic roads deep into enemy territory.

Resolutely overwhelming the enemy, absolutely defending the Truong Son area of operations, and effectively escorting the mechanized formations moving north and south. The Truong Son command also sent in strong anti-aircraft regiments, which rapidly moved south to defend the key positions in the southern part of the route. The infantry regiments and divisions took up positions near the enemy, pressured them, and forced them to flee far from the transportation route, while also being prepared to coordinate with the military regions and main-force units of the High Command to smash the enemy's defense lines in the various areas.

In order to serve the mechanized troop units urgently advancing to the fronts, the entire Ho Chi Minh strategic route promptly organized technical support stations, fuel stations, and supply-issuing stations into a solid support system. Furthermore, they organized many repair teams to accompany the technical combat arms which were on the move.

With regard to the strategic logistical transportation mission, the truck divisions assumed responsibility for operational zones 400 kilometers long. Appropriate operational formulas were applied to the noncombat and combat areas. The depot battalions were reorganized and reassigned to be able to operate urgently and continually, and assure the handling of large quantities of cargo in view of the new situation and mission.

So that leadership and command could be deep and close and promptly reach the divisions and the detachments defending the key positions, and especially to assure that they could keep up with the rate advance in the course of combat, and to maintain contact with the battlefields and maintain the telephone line to the High Command, the Communications Command helped the Truong Son transportation route deploy the various kinds of wired and wireless communications equipment, and helped create a communications network which was multi-echelon but also assured that command directly reached the combat units on an area of operations 100,000 square kilometers in extent.

Thus the organization of the Truong Son forces during that period had to undergo very great changes. The zone divisions were abandoned and were organized into truck divisions, military engineer divisions, anti-aircraft divisions, infantry divisions, and technical repair, POL, communications, depot, service, and other regiments. All fought under the close combined command of the Truong Son Command. That was a revolutionary step with regard to organization in order to create a great leap forward with regard to effectiveness. But we also had to carry out that task while engaged in combat, without bringing everything to a halt. It may be said that during those days our cadres and men performed all tasks with great urgency and resolutely overcame all the minor obstacles in order to rapidly perfect organization and sent it into a new orbit.

Thanks to that early preparation, when the Party Central Committee decided to give large-scale aid to the Khmers so that our friends could have sufficient strength to completely liberate their country, the Ho Chi Minh transportation network was able to deliver the cargo very promptly. During each cycle we supplied thousands of tons of weapons, and hundreds of trucks with which to move weapons. And when the Political Bureau decided to change over to the phase of strategic offensive, simultaneous uprisings, and the liberation of the south, the entire network was prepared and promptly used nearly 10,000 motor vehicles of all kinds to fulfill such missions as:

Moving the corps which attacked the enemy with marvellous speed.¹⁶

Transporting nearly 20,000 tons of weapons, equipment, and essential supplies to the front.

Urgently moving the combat engineer regiments along with the attacking units, in order to destroy mines, repair roads, build bridges, etc.

Quickly transferring the anti-aircraft regiments and divisions, and the infantry regiments and divisions, of Command 559 from the west to the east, and advancing deeply into the Tay Nguyen and Nam Bo battlefields.

The forward headquarters of the Truong Son Command also moved close to the front command of the High Command in order to provide prompt guidance to meet the operational requirements. At the same time, the Truong Son Command also organized many cadre groups to immediately go to the various areas

and exercise unified command over the forces which were spreading out along our army's lines of attack against the defensive lines all the way to Saigon--the last lair of the U.S. and its puppets. The Truong Son troops placed troops along each segment of the principal roads, in order to direct vehicles and protect the troops moving into the newly liberated areas.

In general, the activities of the military transportation network during that period, and especially during the first days of the General Offensive and general uprisings of the spring of 1975, help us understand more deeply the strategic value of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system. It:

Providing extremely effective aid and assuring that the Khmer army could continually attack the Lon Nol gang (at a time when the sea route to Kampuchea had been closed off by the enemy). The Khmer puppet government was forced to surrender as we were liberating the Tay Nguyen area.

Aiding the Pathet Lao and coordinating with them to defend the liberated area and victoriously fulfill the revolutionar missions.

During the spring of 1975 the Truong Son troops made use of the latent capabilities they had accumulated over the years, reached the apogee of their capability to coordinate in campaigns, fulfilled their missions, and continually transported large formations over a vast area, in unfamiliar terrain in areas formerly controlled by the enemy and in a very short period of time; thus helping the soldiers and people of our nation to completely liberate the south and win a complete victory.

During the 16 years prior to that, the Ho Chi Minh strategic military transportation system passed through several major phases, and after each phase of fierce combat the Truong Son troops gained additional maturity and strength, and increasingly took the initiative in coordinating with the battlefields to defeat the enemy, win control of the people, build bases, continually develop the liberated area, and expand the Truong Son area of operations, which was 1,000 kilometers long and 100 kilometers across. They took the initiative in building a complete network of strategic roads from the area bordering on the north to Loc Ninh. It consisted of 5 "chokepoint routes" and 16 lateral roads, and totalled nearly 20,000 kilometers of motor roads of various categories. They were able to create and forge an army made up of many combat arms which fought skilfully in a combined structure on the strategic military transportation front. They defeated all schemes of strategic interdiction by air of the U.S. air force and the puppet ground troops. The Truong Son troops fought 112,135 battles with the U.S. air force, and fought 1,263 battles against nibbling operations and commando raids of the enemy infantry; they transported 454,750,000 kilometer/tons of cargo of the various kinds to aid the battlefields, and transported 2 million people.*

*They also shot down 2,455 airplanes of the various types, and killed 18,740 of the enemy.

All of those brilliant victories were the results of the stubborn combat and creative labor of hundreds of thousands of our cadres, enlisted men, Assault Youth, and frontline civilian laborers on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Those victories also originated in the political, military, and international lines of our Party and Uncle Ho's truth that "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom." The inviolable position and strength of that strategic transportation network were direct manifestations of the decisive roles of the close solidarity of the three Indochinese countries and of the socialist north with regard to the liberation war in the south and to the neighboring countries. Over a long period of time, the Truong Son troops strictly carried out the guidance policies of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Party Committee and created extremely basic factors:

They successfully created predeployed battlefield positions in the strategic areas occupying controlling positions on the Indochinese Peninsula, and brought the entire Truong Son region into the decisive battle. They made ready the capability to rapidly move many large units and attack with marvelous speed in all directions. They contributed to advancing people's war to a professional, modern level.

With such material conditions, they participated positively in resolving the problems of a vast battlefield and met the time-urgent needs of the historic campaign in the spring of 1975.

On the basis of the prepared "position," they developed the existing "strength," and assured sufficient strength to attack continually, carry out strategic interdictions and encircling campaigns, rapidly advance to the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, and win a great, rapid, and all-round victory.

Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, evaluating the results of the fighting and construction on the Ho Chi Minh Trail transportation network, regarded it as "one of the outstanding accomplishments of our Party's political and military lines and a valuable experience which further enriched our country's military science and art."

Premier Phan Van Dong emphasized that "The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a manifestation of the combat solidarity of the nation's people, so it is wonderfully durable. Although the enemy tried every way to shut it down, it continued to develop with increasing rapidity and solidity, in accordance with the pace of the war."

After listening to a summary report on the aid provided by the Truong Son troops via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, comrade Truong Chinh concluded that "We won victory in our resistance war against the U.S. for national salvation because we had a correct resistance war line based on the common line of the Party. But in order to defeat the aggressor army, with regard to the infrastructure of the resistance war, we had to have strategic roads such as the Truong Son road, and know how to use those roads in the best possible manner to achieve great feats of arms."

Those were guiding conclusions of practical significance with regard to the present war to defend our socialist homeland against the expansionist aggressors.

FOOTNOTES

1. From the notes of comrade Le Duan in his "Truong Son Notebook," 1973.
2. May 1959.
3. Between 1965 and 1968, the U.S. Air Force attacked with 61,732 sorties. In 1969 and 1970, the attacks increased four-fold over previous years. In 1971 and 1972 the number of B52 sorties increased to 21,500. In a period of only 10 years, the U.S. attacked with 800,000 sorties, including 33,460 B52 sorties, dropped 2 million tons of bombs, and launched 120 military operations and 1,285 commando raids.
4. "Fight skilfully, transport skilfully, help friends skilfully, and produce skilfully."
5. Resolution of the Party Committee of the Truong Son Troops, October 1975.
6. Regiments 70 and 71.
7. In the contiguous areas, transport trucks were used and boats were begun to be used to transport cargo to the battlefields.
8. Routes 1, 2, and 3. Each route had three or four waystations.
9. In a period of only 5 months we shot down 323 U.S. planes.
10. Letter from the Central Military Party Committee to the conference recapitulating the transportation campaign on the Ho Chi Minh Trail (May 1967). Signed by comrade Vo Nguyen Giap.
11. Counting only reconnaissance plans, not attack planes.
12. The Tra An strongpoint, 25 days. Ta Lo Tac, 70 days. San Phan Tac, 25 days.
13. Resolution 71 of the Central Military Party Committee.
14. The roads crossing from east of the Truong Son to the west were called "chokepoint" or "door-passing" routes. Those military terms were used to indicate places that were fiercely attacked by the enemy, where we had to use military strength to open the "door" so that our troops could pass through.
15. During that period, the transportation facilities attained the following norms:

Land routes: 127,670,000 ton/kilometers.

River routes: 10,260,000 ton/kilometers.

Pipelines: 9,210,000 ton/kilometers.

16. 1st Corps went by way of the western artery and Route 14, extended. 2d Corps advanced along Route 1.

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CSO: 4209

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

WAYS TO SAFEGUARD RIVER TRANSPORTED GOODS DISCUSSED

Hanoi GIAO THONG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 30 Nov 79 pp 1,7

[Article by P.V. (Reporter): "Conference on Safeguarding Commodities Transported by River"]

[Text] Implementing the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, recently, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation and the Ministry of Interior jointly organized a conference to review things, learn the lessons and find ways to promote the protection of commodities transported by river in the northern provinces. The conference was directed by Tran Quyet, a member of the Party Central Committee and vice minister of interior, and Binh Tam, the vice minister of communications and transportation. The general report by Tran Lung, the head of Economic Protection Department 4 subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, and the supplementary report by Dao Van Nhuong, the head of the Department of River Transport subordinate to the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, showed that in recent years, in implementing Resolution 228 and Directive 859, the communications and transportation and public security sectors have, together with the sectors and localities concerned, coordinated things closely and sought many methods in order to protect socialist property. Thus, losses have been greatly reduced as compared with before. As compared with 1978, the number of cases that took place during the first 6 months of 1979 declined 40 percent and the quantity of goods stolen declined 30 percent. River transport enterprises 202 and 210, the Haiphong River Transport Corporation and so on have made great efforts and satisfactorily protected the commodities. Various boats have regularly completed the assigned tasks, maintained the

safety of the commodities and means of transportation and, for 18 consecutive years, earned the title of socialist labor team.

However, theft of socialist property is still a serious problem. During the first 6 months of 1978, of the total number of cases of theft of state property and commodities transported along the various routes, 60 percent occurred during river transport. Some cases involved the theft of tens of tons of goods and some cases were of a collective nature, with cadres and party members knowing what was going on but ignoring the matter. Between 1 June and 30 July 1979, Transportation Enterprise 208 and the Ha Nam Ninh [enterprise] damaged, during transport, 1,200 tons of rice, of which 64 tons were no longer fit to eat and had to be used for raising livestock and 2 tons had to be thrown away. Besides this, because of a lack of responsibility a number of boats have damaged and lost many commodities and much property of the state.

The conference heard a number of realistic reports from a number of local units, such as Enterprise 202, the Chau Giang public security district, the Ninh Dong public security station and so on, that have made many good changes in opposing negative aspects. From the realistic reports and many ideas discussed, the conference obtained a number of good measures. It has confidence in the positive measures and is certain that the theft, damage and loss of state commodities on the river transportation routes will be stopped and virtually eliminated. Reviewing the conference, the vice minister of interior emphasized a number of specific tasks that must be done in the coming period:

The organization and management of the river sector, with regard to the ranks of cadres, seamen and people engaged in river transport work, must be urgently and resolutely rearranged and strengthened.

Efforts must be concentrated on consolidating, in all respects, the movement to maintain security in the villages located along the rivers, and passive phenomena along the river routes must be handled and eliminated. A mass movement to defend the security of the fatherland must be launched in the river transport sector and in the localities along the river routes.

Forces must be strengthened and guard patrols to protect communications and transportation along the river routes must be promoted.

The communications and transportation and public security sectors must coordinate this with the localities and sectors concerned in order to ensure the security of the commodities and means of transportation during the shipping, receiving and handling of the goods.

The conference awarded prizes to the enterprises, localities, units and boats that had made an effort, done a good job of opposing theft and illegal trading and satisfactorily protected socialist property.

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CSO: 4209

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HA NAM NINH DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Dec 79 p 2

[Party Building column by Le Chuc: "Ha Nam Ninh Develops Its Potentials and Uniformly Develops the Movement"]

[Text] Advanced Model Units and the Mass Movement

Ha Nam Ninh is a province that has many advanced model units. The second congress of delegates of the provincial party organization analyzed the valuable lessons and the tremendous potentials of the advanced model units. There are models in the intensive cultivation of rice and good management, such as the Giao An, Phu Khanh, Xuan Tien, My Tho, Trung Thanh and My Thang Cooperatives; models in livestock production, such as the Hong Quang and Giao Thanh Cooperatives; and districts that are models in many respects, such as Hai Hau District. All areas have units that are advanced model units in the expansion of winter crop production. A number of deficient installations have become good grain producing installations (the Ninh Thang-Hoa Lu Cooperative, for example). Local industry has such advanced model units as the Ha Nam Ninh Machine Enterprise, the Tan Tien Machine Cooperative and the Nam Ninh Brick Enterprise. Each year, Nam Ninh District and Nam Dinh City achieve an artisan and handicraft output value of 30 million to 41 million dong. Ha Nam Ninh is also the province that leads the entire country in the development of education, as symbolized by the Bac Ly School. Practically all sectors and districts in all three areas, the lowlands, the coastal area and the foothills, have advanced model units. These are manifestations of stability, of overcoming every challenge, of thoroughly understanding and applying the line of the party, of establishing a rather good corps of key cadres and establishing the right of collective ownership of the working people.

However, why have these advanced model units not been expanded to the entire province? Many delegates to the congress stated that the revolutionary movement in Ha Nam Ninh has not developed in a strong, uniform or stable manner over the past few years. There are many reasons for this, but the

reason deserving of attention is the failure to deeply understand the economic development line in the initial stage of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production. There have been many shortcomings in the application of the various economic laws and policies. The ability to organize and guide implementation is still weak. There are large potentials in labor, arable land, the forests and the ocean waters; however, manpower has not been mobilized throughout the province so that the province can, through its own efforts, achieve an extraordinary victory in agriculture and truly make agriculture the base for industrial development. Under the light of the resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the delegates attending the congress displayed a high spirit of self-criticism and criticism and seriously reviewed the performance of tasks during the 3 years from 1977 to 1979.

The major shortcoming has been the decline in grain output. Total grain output has declined by nearly 200,000 tons in the past 3 years, thereby not only causing the standard of living of cooperative member farmers and their contributions to the state to decline, but also adversely affecting the development of livestock production and the production of industrial crops, which, in turn, has led to many imbalances. The state has had to supply the locality with additional grain each year. While grain output has declined, many fields have continued to lie fallow. There has been a rather serious waste of labor. The decline in grain output is the source of many difficulties. There has been a lengthy shortage of many consumer goods made from local materials (soysauce, rush mats, building materials, pottery and so forth). Local industry, especially the machine, electricity, building and communications-transportation sectors, have not kept abreast of nor taken the initiative and supported agricultural production. There are many shortcomings in the management of supplies and goods. This has restricted the initiative of installations and caused negative phenomena to develop. The report of the executive committee of the provincial party committee at the congress emphasized: this situation cannot be tolerated nor allowed to continue in a province that has many large economic potentials, a province that lies within a mobile strategic area and a province that is part of the key grain and food growing region of the entire country.

How Can the Grain Balance Be Maintained?

Clearly aware of their responsibility to the entire country, the delegates set forth norms on grain, food product and consumer goods production, the fishing industry and exports as well as on stabilizing and maintaining the standard of living, strengthening the national defense system, maintaining security and building the party. The delegates spent much time discussing ways to establish a grain balance, establish grain reserves and increase the contribution of grain to the state. With a population of 2.6 million, the province needs about 190,000 tons of grain each year to provide to

the 650,000 persons who do not engage in agricultural production. Calculations have shown that the province lacks about 60,000 tons of grain each year. How can a balance be established? The delegates decided to accelerate intensive cultivation, multicropping and the opening of new land to cultivation in the state-operated sector, the collective sector, the household sector, agencies, schools and enterprises. By increasing the degree of uniformity of intensive cultivation, an effort will be made to achieve an average yield of 40 to 50 quintals per hectare by 1981 in order to achieve an output of 680,000 tons of paddy or more. The key rice growing area in the five southern districts of the province will continue to be built and strengthened. The province has selected more than 200 that have a high average amount of cropland (roughly 1,000 square meters) and the conditions needed to rapidly increase the output of commodity grain for appropriate investments. Over the next 2 years, 8,000 hectares of fallow land in fields and 3,000 hectares of land in silt fields and along the seacoast will be put into grain production. Full importance is being attached to developing the production of subsidiary food crops and grain crops in both seasons. The intensive cultivation movement will be expanded to 50,000 hectares of winter crops following the example of the advanced model units. These units are: the Dao Ly Cooperative, which lies in the two rice crop area; the Yen Nhan Cooperative in the subsidiary food crop area; the Nghia Loi Cooperative in the coastal area; and the Ninh Phong Cooperative in the foothills. Product management will be strengthened through the implementation of two-way contracts and the purchasing of grain at negotiated prices. For enterprises and agencies that lack work and, in addition, must reduce the size of their staffs, worksites will be organized to produce grain. The cities, towns and wards will borrow land in order to achieve partial self-sufficiency in grain. Nam Dinh City will increase the production of export goods and increase the value of its trade goods, thereby creating the conditions for importing additional grain to maintain a grain balance within its area. On the basis of endeavoring to resolve the grain problem well, the other economic activities will be accelerated.

To perform this number one political task, Ha Nam Ninh must do a better job of simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions on the basic level. To Huu, alternate member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Party Central Committee, emphasized this point in his address to the congress. He deeply analyzed the relationship and the coordinated nature of the measures of water conservancy, fertilizer, the selection of varieties, the agricultural schedule, mechanization, the redistribution of labor, the strengthening of cooperatives and the training of the corps of key cadres. The province will continue to perform good water conservancy work in order to create a complete base for mechanization. If importance is not attached to redistributing labor (including redistributing labor within the province), it will be impossible to achieve returns from mechanization or maintain a grain balance within the territory. Mechanization must be carried out in a well coordinated manner, in water conservancy,

fertilizer production, the improvement of soil, the production of new varieties and cultivation, in order to achieve high economic returns. Over the next 2 years, the province must supply more than 111,000 laborers in accordance with the requirements of the state, 400,000 of whom [sic] will be laborers going to build new economic zones outside the province, in conjunction with reducing the birthrate within the province to 1.85 percent. Ha Nam Ninh is one of the provinces that has many shortcomings in guiding the effort to strengthen the new production relations. Many places have increased the size of cooperatives without providing the required conditions (31 percent of the cooperatives now measure 500 hectares or more in size; of this number, there are 20 cooperatives with 700 hectares of land and 2 cooperatives with 1,000 hectares). The expansion in the size of cooperatives has led to production units that are too large. To Huu analyzed the pressing need to re-examine the size of cooperatives, which has become too large, too large to manage properly, as well as the pressing needs to reorganize the various production sectors and expand business operations in a manner closely linked to redistributing labor, strengthening the production units and implementing the principle of distribution in accordance with labor well. These are also measures of decisive significance in the process of endeavoring to achieve a grain balance within the locality.

Improving the Management of and Strengthening the Installations

The policies of the party and the resolution of the congress are ultimately implemented at the installations. Over the next 2 years, importance will be attached to improving management and guiding implementation at installations. Applying the experiences of Hai Hau District, the first step taken will be to bring the contents and methods of planning up to date and make well coordinated use of the various tools of management in order to implement economic laws and policies well. The congress decided that the contents of the plan must reflect the spirit of self-reliance, of establishing a local balance, especially a grain balance, and must develop each potential that each locality has in its labor, arable land, supplies, capital and material-technical bases as best possible. The plan must be formulated from the lower level upward in a truly democratic fashion to insure the implementation of the plan on all three levels: the province, the district and the installation. The plan must be closely linked to the market and realistic plans must be formulated through the signing of economic contracts. It is necessary to strengthen the system of economic information extending from the laborer to the various management organizations and levels.

To strengthen installations, it is necessary to improve the quality of the party organization and regularly focus efforts on conducting a good campaign to reorganize production, improve management, strengthen the management apparatus and, in particular select and correctly deploy the corps

of key cadres. It is necessary to improve the theoretical, political and economic management qualifications of the corps of cadres at installations. The growth of the party must be intensified in order to constantly increase the fighting strength of the party organization. The activities of the mass organizations must be accelerated in order to uphold the right of collective ownership of the working people participating in the management of the economy and society and effectively struggle against negative phenomena, especially pilfering, bribery and intimidation of the masses. It is necessary to uphold party discipline and implement the socialist system of law. The agencies must reorganize and intensify their management and implement the various regulations on inspections, control work and the public reporting on finances and property so that the masses can supervise them and stop negative phenomena. The resolution of the congress also sets forth many positive measures for improving deficient installations and helping to strengthen material-technical bases, especially at places encountering many difficulties in production, places that have the conditions needed to rapidly increase the output of products and gradually advance the movement in a uniform and steady manner. It is necessary to research ways to supplement, perfect and implement, in a well coordinated manner, the system of cooperative management regulations and necessary to implement the "five public statements" system well. It is necessary to strengthen state farms and state-operated stations to insure that they operate at a profit and necessary to streamline the apparatus managing and guiding agriculture in order to support the requirements of installations well. We must organize and guide pilot projects that become economic and cultural models and must launch a mass emulation movement to work, produce, study and catch up to the advanced model units. Experience must be gained in order to continue building the district and strengthening the district level so that the district truly becomes an administrative-economic management level closely linked to installations within one production structure. This is a comprehensive planning level that has its own budget. Due to the requirements of reorganizing production at installations, Ha Nam Ninh will also be attaching importance to strengthening the provincial level, especially the economic and technical sectors, in order to form a system and insure the implementation of the principle of management by sector coordinated with management by level.

The second congress of delegates of the provincial party organization was marked by a new atmosphere. The resolution of the congress has the strength to inspire the entire party organization and all the people of the province to uphold their tradition of unity, militancy and labor, develop each potential well, advance the movement uniformly and glorious complete the tasks of the new stage.

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL ON ENHANCING SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

BK241441 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 18 Jan 80 BK

[NHAN DAN 19 January Editorial: "Qualitatively Enhance Socialist Transformation"]

[Text] Continuing to carry out socialist transformation in the south is one of the important economic tasks of the 1980 state plan, it is the main objective of the revolution on production relations aimed at implementing the party's line on economy in our daily life so as to combine the effort to expand the production forces with the establishment and consolidation of new production relations, thereby making production relations between the North and South uniform.

In the recent past, socialist transformation of industry, artisan industry and handicrafts has produced positive results as the state has nationalized and turned a considerable number of capitalist-owned industrial establishments into joint state-private enterprises. More than 500 cooperatives and 9,000 work cooperation or production solidarity teams have been set up by the artisan industry and handicrafts, employing 70 percent of the manual laborers. Meanwhile, the maritime products sector has successfully encouraged 60 percent of the fishermen to join collective work in various production solidarity and work cooperation teams and a number of fishing cooperatives. The sector has also renovated various fish sauce processing establishments and refrigeration enterprises and set up corporations responsible for the supply and purchase of raw and other materials. As a result, the state has been able to control 40 percent of the output of fresh maritime products and [words indistinct] percent of the output of processed maritime products.

Achievements in socialist transformation would be greater if shortcomings were not committed in the implementation of specific tasks. Failure to promptly eliminate all nonsocialist economic components and carry out transformation in close combination with the building of socialism has affected to certain degrees the efforts to increase production and consolidate production relations.

The objective of socialist transformation in the final stage is not only to eradicate exploitation and nationalize or collectivize production materials, but also to establish an increasingly perfect production relationship aimed at increasing labor productivity and social production.

The Sixth Party Central Committee Plenum resolution says: It is necessary to thoroughly understand that the objective of transformation is to accelerate production. The rule that we must firmly adhere to is the combination of the transformation work with the development and organization of production without hastiness and drastic administrative measures. The resolution also affirms that there are still five economic components in industry in the south--state-run, joint state-private, collective, individual, and capitalist and private-owned. Therefore, it is necessary to have correct policies for each of these economic components.

The principal guideline for those industrial establishments which have already become state-run or joint state-private enterprises is to continue to consolidate and reorganize production, increase the numbers of managerial and professional cadres, indoctrinate the workers on socialism, and appropriately use those bourgeois industrialists who have taken part in socialist transformation. At the same time, they must improve various aspects of the managerial work in accordance with the principle of socialist production and business management so as to increase labor productivity, improve the quality of products, and develop the superior nature over other economic components.

As for establishments which have been transformed into joint state-private enterprises in a forcible manner, it is necessary to specifically evaluate their progress by proceeding from their production profits to adopt appropriate measures to bring them onto the right track aimed at consolidating their production. And if necessary, we must correct them so that they can perform their work in accordance with the policies.

While the main targets for socialist transformation in the artisan industry and handicrafts are those engaged in small-scale production, efforts must be made to firmly maintain the principles of mutually beneficial voluntariness and democratic management. We must go by the production requirements and technical conditions to appropriately adopt such organizational forms and sizes as cooperatives, production teams, and manual work among individuals and families to insure that production is firmly maintained and expanded with an abundant source of diversified products both during and after the transformation process. Transformation of fishery and the fish sauce processing industry should also be carried out in accordance with the aforementioned principles, using appropriate forms from the lower to the higher levels in gradual and firm manner in order to increase production.

Increasing labor productivity and production to improve the people's livelihood is the highest criterion to evaluate the correctness of various policies, including the policy on socialist transformation. Meanwhile, to qualitatively enhance socialist transformation means to carry out this task in

accordance with the prescribed rules and policies. In view of this, it is necessary to care for and consolidate all socialist economic organizations and collectivize the artisan industry and handicrafts in an active and firm manner while correctly implementing principles on the five economic components so as to make the fullest use of all available potentials to increase production.

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

HANOI RADIO GIVES 10-DAY AGRICULTURAL REVIEW FOR EARLY JANUARY 1980

BK241142 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 22 Jan 80 BK

[Review of Agricultural News for the Past 10 Days]

[Summary] "According to the General Statistics Department, as of 15 January, the entire country had sown and transplanted nearly 720,000 hectares of winter-spring rice, achieving 41 percent of planned norms. The northern provinces transplanted more than 190,000 hectares of 5th-month rice, representing two-thirds of last year's transplanted area, achieving more than 15 percent of planned norms. Southern provinces transplanted more than 520,000 hectares, achieving 78 percent of planned norms."

Due to a shortage of water this year, the 5th-month spring rice transplanting in northern provinces is slower than last year, and in many localities it is being accelerated in order to be on schedule.

Along with the task of transplanting winter-spring rice, localities are also paying attention to harvesting and growing subsidiary crops during the winter-spring crop season.

"As of 15 January, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Son Binh, Ha Bac, Hanoi, Hai Phong, Tuyen Quang and Vinh Phu had harvested more than 20,000 hectares of manioc, more than 20,000 hectares of potato, more than 2,000 hectares of sweet potato and a large area of other vegetables and subsidiary crops.

"Also during the past 10 days, the entire country has planted an additional more than 40,000 hectares of winter vegetables and subsidiary crops, bringing the total cultivated subsidiary and industrial crop area to 529,000 hectares, of which more than 400,000 hectares are subsidiary food crop."

Southern provinces, while engaging in winter-spring production, over the past week accelerated the harvesting of their 10th-month rice.

"As of 15 January, these provinces had harvested nearly 60 percent of the 10th-month rice area. Provinces from Thuan Hai southward harvested nearly

52 percent of the cultivated area. Provinces in the fifth zone had basically completed the harvest. However, harvesting is slow in some localities: Ho Chi Minh City has achieved more than 27 percent; Dong Thap, more than 26 percent; and Phu Khanh, 17 percent. This year's 10th-month rice output is fairly high. B-2 provinces alone have achieved more than 20 quintals per hectare."

Much progress has been made in agricultural production over the past week. However, there still are weak points. Winter-spring rice transplanting in the entire country is still slow. Drought is still present in a number of localities. The harvest of 10th-month rice, the transplanting of winter-spring rice seedlings and the fulfillment of the grain obligation in many southern provinces are still slow.

In order to score achievements to greet the VCP 50th founding anniversary, peasants throughout the country must concentrate on satisfactorily carrying out the following main tasks in the days to come:

1. Southern provinces must use all available facilities and manpower to quickly harvest the remaining 10th-month rice area, completely fulfill the grain obligation to the state, and accelerate the winter-spring rice transplanting. Northern provinces must strive to complete transplanting the remaining 5th-month rice area.
2. Localities must continue antidrought activities by using all means such as electric and oil-powered pumps, buckets and spinning wheels to water rich paddies.
3. Localities must grow an additional spring vegetable and subsidiary crop area, take good care of the cultivated area and satisfactorily harvest winter-spring vegetables.

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

STEPS FOR ESTABLISHING PRODUCTION COMPANIES DISCUSSED

Hanoi NONG NHGIEP in Vietnamese 5 Nov 79 pp 3,7

[Article by Huyen Thanh, (Based on a Document by Nguyen Xuan Truong, the Vice Minister of Agriculture):
"Agricultural Transformation in Southern Vietnam: How Can Production Companies Be Organized?"]

[Text] As of 30 July 1979, former Nam Bo had organized 12,000 production companies. The recent experiences show that the organization of production companies can be divided into three stages: the preparatory stage, the organizational stage and the stage of beginning collective production.

A. The Preparatory Stage

1. Production plans must be made based on the three stages of agricultural cooperativization (production companies, medium-sized cooperatives and large cooperatives). The production companies are 30 to 50 hectares in size. Medium-sized cooperatives are similar in size to a hamlet, 300 to 500 hectares. Large cooperatives are similar in size to a new village, approximately 2,000 hectares. In making plans, anticipated [plans] must be made immediately for the three stages: villages plans, cooperative plans and production company plans. Village and cooperative plans must include the following contents:

a. The boundaries of the new villages must be determined, which will determine the size of the future large cooperatives. The boundaries of the cooperatives must be determined, which will determine the size of the medium-sized cooperatives.

b. The general production guidelines and tasks (of the new villages or cooperatives) concerning agriculture, forestry and fishing (if there are forests or seas) must be determined. A rational crop growing and animal husbandry structure must be determined.

c. A number of principal production norms must be put forth in the long-term (annual) plans. These principal norms must ensure balance between the arable land, the laborers and the materials. The consumer needs of the people, accumulation by the cooperatives and contributions to the state must gradually be put into balance with the production expansion capabilities.

d. Based on the large cooperative (new village) plans, the number and size of the medium-sized cooperatives must be determined. Based on the medium-sized cooperative plans, the number and size of the primary level production units (right now the production companies) must be determined.

e. The steps for completing the plans between now and a fixed year must be determined using the short-term (seasonal and annual) plans. The short-term plans must point out the main norms concerning production, especially concerning food and animal husbandry.

f. The main material and technical bases that must be gradually built must be determined in order to implement the annual plans between now and a fixed year. Above all are the tasks of building fields and water conservancy projects in coordination with building communications routes.

The implementation of the above contents must be divided into two stages: in the first stage the first four contents must be carried out; in the second stage, the last two contents must be carried out. Concerning work methods, the general plans of the district must be relied on in order to make village plans and then, based on this, cooperative and production company plans must be made.

2. Cadres must be trained and forces to go organize production companies must be organized.

There are three types of cadres that must be trained: cadres who will organize production companies according to the program prepared by the Southern Vietnam Agricultural Transformation Committee; professional cadres who specialize

in planning, technology, the setting of labor quotas, statistics, accounting, etc; and production company and cooperative management cadres such as the leaders and assistant leaders of the production companies and directors and vice directors. As for party leadership cadres, the authorities and the mass organizations, although they are not directly involved in organizing production companies, they must receive training concerning agricultural cooperativization in general and production companies in particular.

The cadres must use their abilities to organize work teams and each team must go organize movements in each village.

In the beginning, the party organizations, authorities and mass organizations at the primary level must be strengthened so they can serve as the activists in the movements.

B. The Organizational Stage

1. The masses must be launched to carry on agricultural cooperativization. The main contents are the agricultural cooperativization lines and policies, the organization of production companies and the economic and technical plans of the production companies. It is impossible to carry out the above contents simultaneously and, therefore, the following method must be followed: the contents must be thoroughly understood in turn according to each problem that must be solved; the contents must be thoroughly understood at all levels and within the party and among the people; launching collectives must be coordinated with launching individuals.

2. The elimination of exploitation must be coordinated with the organization of production companies.

In places that are virtually free of exploitation and in fields that are not too different, the people must be actively encouraged to participate in the production companies, all the main means of production must be turned over to the production companies and each person must carry out the collective ownership rights concerning production materials, labor strength, production and consumption.

Places that still have an exploitive class or differences concerning land must persuade the rich peasants to give or sell to the collective some of the land that they have to

hire laborers to work; at the same time, they must encourage them to join production companies, with their remaining land. As for upper middle peasants, they must be persuaded to turn over the land that they cannot work themselves to peasants who do not have land or who do not have enough land; at the same time, they must be encouraged to join the production companies, with their remaining land. As for the other classes of peasants, they must be encouraged to voluntarily and self-consciously join production companies.

Along with organizing production companies, large equipment companies must be organized. Most of the large equipment belongs to rich and upper middle peasants. These people must be persuaded to give or sell the equipment to the companies; at the same time, they must be encouraged to join the companies.

3. The means of production must be collectivized. If the production company cannot collectivize all the chief means of production, except for land, all the production companies in a zone (corresponding in size to future middle-sized cooperatives) can form a partnership to collectivize the buffaloes, cattle and small machines and have the companies in a zone make joint use of these things. The production company management board in the zone is responsible for managing and coordinating these means of production for the production companies in the zone.

If it is not possible to collectivize the buffaloes, cattle and small machines, things must be negotiated with the owners so that the companies can rent them at a reasonable price. After democratic discussions of benefit to both sides have been held and the owners of the buffaloes, cattle and machines have volunteered, the buffaloes, cattle and small machines can be turned over to the companies to use and manage. Although these bovines and small machines belong to the owners, the production companies have the right to use them.

4. Economic and technical plans must be determined. The economic and technical plans of a production company must be part of the economic plans of the production companies presently located in a zone, corresponding in size to future cooperatives (300 to 500 hectares).

These can be called the economic and technical plans of associated companies. The companies in the association of

companies must obey and follow the implementation guidelines of the associated company management board (commonly referred to as the zonal company management board).

The economic plans of the associated companies and of each company must include the following: the general production tasks and guidelines of the companies (and of the associated companies) must be determined; agriculture must be considered the central aspect; the planned norms necessary for each type of crop must be determined; guidelines for building the material and technical bases for production, such as building communications [routes] and water conservancy projects, constructing fields, building animal husbandry pens, etc and organizing a quota system (setting labor norms, arranging work grades and setting wage standards) must be determined; and the system of socialist distribution must be implemented.

5. Production companies must be established and production company management boards must be elected. After the masses have been launched and the above problems have been democratically discussed, a congress to establish production companies must be held. The contents of the congress must include: announcing the results of land adjustments, if any; announcing the resolutions of higher echelons concerning recognition of the production companies and the people recruited into the companies; discussing and determining economic and technical plans and determining a number of main norms concerning immediate production; and discussing and making decisions about collectivizing the means of production, establishing price councils and electing production company heads and deputy heads.

6. There must be joint business activities between the production companies, and specialized business companies must be established. It is essential to organize joint production expansion activities among the production companies in a zone in order to create conditions for these companies to help each other and to rely on each other and together advance to large-scale socialist production and carry on practical training to advance to medium-sized and large-scale cooperatives.

The production companies, specialized business companies and joint business organizations in a zone form, together with the zonal company management board, an organized system and the organized structure of the future cooperatives. The zonal company management board is the forerunner of the

cooperative management board. The production companies are the basic production units. The joint business organizations are the special-sector production units. The large machine companies, the buffalo and cattle associations and the small machine associations are the forerunners of the specialized units.

C. The Step of Beginning Collective Production

In order to guide collective production well, the following must be done:

Based on the production plans of the companies and on the technical regulations for each type of plant and animal, production schedules must be put forth.

Based on the production schedules, the command section must set quotas for each labor group or each laborer, who must strive to carry out the technical tasks.

Based on the production schedules, the command section must guide the various sections so they provide good support to the labor groups, promptly receive and distribute the technical materials and closely inspect and supervise things.

The command section must regularly consult with the heads of the labor groups in order to grasp the production situation, exchange ideas and promptly correct any deviations.

The production company command section, the heads of the labor groups and the heads of the specialized teams (if any) must continually follow what is happening in the fields in order to promptly discover and deal with unexpected calamities. The members of the companies must improve their concept of collective ownership.

D. Strengthening the Leadership of the Party and Authorities With Regard to the Organization of Production Companies

1. All levels of the party, the government and the mass organizations must thoroughly understand and correctly implement the agricultural cooperativization lines, policies and principles of the party. Among the principles for organizing production companies and collectivizing agriculture, the principle of the voluntariness of the masses is very important.

All levels of the party and the local authorities must concentrate their efforts on leading the agricultural cooperativization movement by:

Guiding "points" in order to gain experience in guiding "spheres."

Gathering together a large force of cadres who have been carefully trained in the lines, policies, principles, forms, steps and methods of carrying on agricultural cooperativization.

Mobilizing the sectors in the provinces and districts having plans to support agricultural cooperativization.

The village party committees and the village people's committees must lead the movement closely and create favorable conditions for the higher echelon and primary level cadres to carry on agricultural cooperativization.

2. All levels of the party and the local authorities must actively train cadres and provide enough [cadres] for the movement based on the principle of decentralizing cadre training among the provinces and districts and assigning the work of training professional and specialized cadres to the sectors in the province.

11943

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL STRESSES NEED FOR INTENSIVE CULTIVATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Dec 79 p 1

[Editorial: "The Intensive Cultivation of Spring Rice"]

[Text] The entire country has begun the spring production season. This spring crop must help to insure that agricultural production in 1980 achieves the largest possible results in terms of the amount of area under cultivation, yield and total output.

This year, agricultural production has achieved rather good results, better results than last year. Despite the prolonged drought, the northern provinces planted more than 300,000 hectares of winter crops. This is the largest amount of area ever under the cultivation of winter crops. The production of winter crops in the southern provinces has also been accelerated. A number of new positions and policies providing incentive for production are being widely implemented. Farmers support these positions and policies and are enthusiastically engaging in production. The results of the agricultural cooperativization campaign in the southern provinces have created new, favorable conditions. However, our agricultural production is also encountering a number of difficulties with regard to the supply of technical materials. The unexpected drought is showing signs of spreading.

Generally speaking, the amount of area under cultivation cannot be increased during the spring season. The northern provinces are trying to maintain production at roughly 1,067,000 hectares; the southern provinces will increase their production somewhat, from 660,000 hectares in 1979 to 675,000 hectares. The main guideline is to practice intensive cultivation on all land under cultivation and try to achieve an average, nationwide yield of 24.4 quintals per hectare, with an average of 23 quintals per hectare in the North.

Intensive cultivation is the best measure for developing, in a well coordinated and uniform manner, the potentials that lie in arable land,

labor and material-technical bases in order to achieve rapid returns and low production costs. In previous winter-spring seasons, there was generally a tendency to increase the amount of area under cultivation while giving light attention to intensive cultivation, to the uniformity within each production installation, district and province; the results were that average yields were low and the amount of area under cultivation, although it increased, increased only slightly. As a result of giving light attention to intensive cultivation, there was a failure to correctly and fully implement regulations and systems. Machinery and supplies were used in a wasteful manner and did not yield economic returns. Only one-half the capacity of equipment and machines was utilized. The tremendous potential natural resources capable of supporting agriculture, such as water sources, fertilizer, seed and so forth, were not properly developed.

The various localities should launch an intense, continuous productive labor movement with the immediate objective of implementing the various measures involved in preventing and combating drought, thoroughly till their fields, rapidly spread duckweed over a large area, insure an ample supply of good seedlings, transplant these seedlings on schedule and by the correct techniques and transplant all fields, thereby ushering in an era of practicing intensive cultivation and multicropping, developing production uniformly and making steady and strong progress.

7809

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

PROGRESS ON SPRING CROPS REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Dec 79 pp 1,4

[VNA News Release: "Many Localities Now Cultivating Spring Crops"]

[Text] During this year's 5th month-spring season, Hai Hung Province plans to plant 1,115 hectares, an increase of 660 hectares over last year's 5th month-spring season. The province has established an efficient allocation of 5th month and spring rice varieties in order to achieve high yields and coordinate the various growing seasons during the year. During this season, the province is using primarily the Nong Nghiep 8 variety of rice, which will be raised on 55 to 60 percent of its fields, and the dwarf Chan Lun and TH 2 varieties, which will be raised on 30 to 35 percent of its fields; on 5-10 percent of its fields, the province is propagating the Can Tho, Dong Nai and Nong Nghiep 1 varieties of rice for use as seed during the 10th month season; rice variety 314 is only being transplanted on 5 percent of the province's fields. During this season, in addition to its primary method of starting and transplanting seedlings, the province will directly sow 30 percent or more of fields at places that have the necessary conditions.

The province sowed 1,477 hectares of 5th month seedlings, variety 314, during the best season, thereby providing enough seedlings to transplant all of the area required under the plan. Cooperatives have concentrated on sowing the spring rice variety Nong Nghiep 8 between 1 and 10 December, the best season for sowing this variety. On the basis of the planting schedule of the province, the cooperatives have formulated supply, labor, draft power and other plans in order to sow and transplant their crops on schedule. The cooperatives have virtually completed tilling their fields for the 5th month-spring crop (with the exception of those fields on which winter crops are now growing), having tilled 21,500 hectares more than at the same time last year, 16,763 hectares of which have been plowed by machine, a two-fold increase compared to the same period of time last year.

The districts have organized the construction of water conservancy projects, dredged canals and ditches, repaired pump stations, propagated duckweed and

made efficient, economical use of water sources in order to have ample irrigation water for winter crops and for flooding dry fields in the near future. Nine of the twelve districts and cities have collected and processed nearly 332,000 tons of livestock manure of all types.

Ha Son Binh Province has been closely guiding the sowing of more than 7,000 hectares of spring seedlings, primarily seedlings of the Nong Nghiep 8 variety. The province has established committees on the provincial and district levels and at the agricultural cooperatives to guide the cultivation of spring seedlings.

All cooperatives have inspected the quantity and quality of their seed and redistributed seed in order to have an ample supply of seed in accordance with the established allocation of varieties.

Practically all districts and cooperatives organized the technical training in the cultivation of spring seedlings for the key cadres of cooperatives and production units at an early date.

The water conservancy sector has coordinated with the agricultural sector in guiding the distribution of water and the delivery of water to each area in support of the cultivation of spring seedlings. Ha Son Binh Province has quickly completed the dredging and opening of main junctions, quickly repaired and constructed dozens of new mobile pump stations, increased the supply of diesel pumps and promptly provided sources of water for starting seedlings and transplanting rice.

The districts in the key rice growing area, Thanh Oai, Thuong Tin, Phu Xuyen, Ung Hoa and so forth, have rapidly strengthened and established from 200 to 300 groups specializing in composting manure and starting and cultivating spring seedlings.

Thai Binh Province has plowed more than 57,220 hectares, 69 percent of its fields, twice as much as the same period of time last year.

The prolonged sunny weather has made fields dry and difficult to plow, but cooperatives have made good use of the draft power of 30,000 buffalo and 310 large tractors to increase the rate of plowing.

Vu Thu District has plowed 8,300 hectares of spring fields, thereby completing more than 81 percent of its plan and leading the other districts of the province.

Quynh Phu District has mobilized 57 large tractors and 97 small tractors for plowing and harrowing, thereby insuring that 7,000 hectares are plowed by machine during this season, 2,300 hectares of which have been plowed to standard specifications. To date, the district has plowed 7,800 hectares, 68 percent of the area to be planted.

The districts of Dong Hung, Hung Ha, Kien Xuong and Tien Hai have concerned themselves with providing their buffalo herds with additional nutrition by cutting grass and feeding them additional bran so that buffalo can work additional hours, consequently, the rate of plowing has been increased. Some 9,000 hectares have been plowed 50 percent faster by the province.

The cooperatives that are skilled in intensive cultivation, such as Vu Thang, Vu Quy and Vu Trung in Kien Xuong District, Nguyen Xa, Hoa Nam and Dong La in Dong Hung District and Quynh Bao in Quynh Phu District, have completed their plowing.

Together with plowing fields, many cooperatives have organized forces well to turn over the soil in fields by hand and irrigate some fields early in order to propagate duckweed.

Ha Bac Province has guided the various cooperatives in inspecting, classifying and providing more labor to cultivate and combat drought on nearly 6,000 hectares of seedlings that have been sown (including 4,000 hectares of 5th month seedlings) while continuing to sow additional spring seedlings in order to have enough seedlings to transplant 81,000 hectares of 5th month-spring rice on schedule (including 55,000 hectares of spring rice).

The province has mobilized the 202 water conservancy units and the field construction units at cooperatives to rapidly dredge the headwater projects and quickly provide irrigation water to the areas specializing in seedling cultivation and the cultivation of winter crops. The Bao Son, Cau River, Bac Duong and Gia Thuan farmland water conservancy systems have sent irrigation schedules to the various cooperatives and have been using water economically in order to store water in lakes and ponds and lowlying fields in order to irrigate seedlings. The districts of Yen The, Tan Yen, Yen Dung and Lang Giang have guided cooperatives in completing canals and ditches, rebuilding area and plot embankments and selecting lowlying areas convenient for obtaining irrigation water for this season's seedlings. Many cooperatives in Hiep Hoa, Viet Yen and Thuan Thanh Districts have installed additional sluices to obtain water from the farmland water conservancy system, established fertilization regulations, intensified their inspections, applied additional livestock manure to seedling crops that are growing slowly and started additional spring seedlings in order to transplant all their fields.

The cooperatives of Tien Luc in Lang Giang District, Canh Thuy and Tien Dung in Yen Dung District and Phon Xuong in Yen The District have organized specialized units to cultivate seedlings which, using diesel pumps and bailing buckets, have irrigated and fertilized each hectare of seedlings that had become dry with 1 to 2 tons of livestock manure.

The mountain districts of Son Dong, Luc Ngan, Luc Nam and Yen The have organized a force of shock youths to create additional sources of water by digging lakes and building dams and rapidly complete irrigation canal systems in order to provide water to hundreds of hectares of seedlings.

To date, the compatriots of the ethnic minorities in Dac Lac Province have harvested nearly 50 percent of their early winter sweet potato crop. As a result of cultivating this crop well and preventing and controlling insects well, the winter sweet potato crop in Dac Lac is rather good, with yields averaging 2 to 4 quintals per hectare higher than last season.

Ban Me Thuot City has more than 1,000 hectares of sweet potatoes, the most in the province; as a result of deploying labor and arranging transportation well, nearly 600 hectares of sweet potatoes were dug in only 5 days.

Together with harvesting and processing winter sweet potatoes, the production installations in Dac Lac are making every effort to harvest the remaining nearly 3,000 hectares of 10th month rice and plant the various winter-spring crops on schedule.

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AGRICULTURE

CHARACTERISTICS OF NONG NGHIEP 75-6 RICE DISCUSSED

Hanoi NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese : 20 Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Trong An, Ministry of Agriculture: "Short-Term Varieties of Rice Have a Prospect: Nong Nghiep 75-6"]

[Text] Nong Nghiep 75-6, a hybrid variety of rice that has a growing period of 90-95 days, is very suited to the early tenth-month season in order to promptly free the land before 5 October for planting early winter season crops, such as sweet potatoes, corn, watermelons and garlic.

The noteworthy characteristics of Nong Nghiep 75-6 are that it stools poorly but the heads are large, the grains are large and long and there are many grains in the head and, therefore, the potential yield is higher than that for the Nong Nghiep 23 variety. If 55-60 clusters are transplanted per square meter with 5-6 plants per cluster or if it is sown directly and the density is maintained, the yield will easily reach 30 quintals per hectare.

Nong Nghiep 75-6 has widespread suitability. It resists harmful insects and diseases well but does not require much fertilizer; applying large quantities of fertilizer easily leads to "kho van" disease. In the Red River Delta and the Bac Bo midlands, the seedlings are sown between 1 and 10 June and transplanted between 20 June and 5 July. When sowing the seedlings, 25-30 kilograms are sown per 0.1 mau. A suitable age for the seedlings is 12-15 days. The strengths of this variety are that the uncooked rice is unblemished and not discolored, it is soft and delicious when cooked and it is very suitable for export.

The Gia Tan cooperative in Tu Loc district, Hai Hung Province, has included the 75-6 variety in the four-crop per year crop rotation system as follows:

Nong Nghiep 8 (spring rice), Nong Nghiep 75-6 (early tenth-month rice), watermelons (winter) and kohlrabi (late). By applying 10 tons of stable manure, 130 kilograms of nitrogenous sulfate fertilizer, 250 kilograms of phosphate fertilizer and 130 kilograms of potash fertilizer, each hectare will give a yield of 36 quintals over a wide area. The plant reaches a height of 0.90 meters to 1 meter, higher than the Nong Nghiep 23 variety by 10 to 20 centimeters, and, therefore, it gives much straw. The cooperative members like this variety because it produces a good harvest of paddy and straw.

The Nong Nghiep 75-6 variety seed can be multiplied during the spring season. The best thing is to sow it directly between 1 and 15 February. The growing period is 110 days and the yield can reach 40 quintals per hectare.

The seed of the Nong Nghiep 75-6 variety is dormant and therefore after the harvesting is completed, if the seed is soaked in order to transplant it immediately, the sprouting rate will be low.

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CHRONOLOGY

HANOI'S REVIEW OF EVENTS FOR 16 SEP-15 OCT 1979

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Nov 79 p 16

[Text]

SEPTEMBER

17. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong concludes his official friendship visit to Jamaica. A joint communiqué is published.

— The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam issues instructions on the celebration of the 35th founding anniversary of the Vietnam People's Army (22 December 1944 — 22 December 1979).

— A Kampuchean national song and dance ensemble, comprising 60 artistes who survived the genocidal Pol Pot regime, arrives in Vietnam on a visit.

20. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong concludes his friendship visit to the Republic of Cuba begun on 18 September 1979.

— The Secretariat of the International Union of Students launches a campaign to assist Vietnam entitled "A Cultural Centre for Vietnamese Students".

— At Vietnam's request the UN Secretary-General publishes the judgment of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Tribunal to try the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique for genocide in August 1979.

— The 7th session of the second round of the Vietnam-China talks results in nothing because of China's obstinate attitude.

2. Closing in Caracas (Venezuela) of the 66th Interparliamentary Conference. On the proposal of the Vietnamese National Assembly delegation, the Conference rejects the British delegation's proposal to add the issue of "Vietnamese emigrants" to the agenda.

— The 24th session of the UN General Assembly decides to let Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique keep the Kampuchean seat in this session (71 votes for, 35 against and 34 abstentions).

22. The Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam issues a memorandum on the Chinese authorities' increased armed provocations and war preparations against Vietnam.

23. Signing in Hanoi of an agreement on Vietnam's help to Laos to build a number of projects in Xieng-khuang province.

24. Le Duan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, receives Roland Leroy and his wife. Mr Leroy is a member of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party and Editor of the daily newspaper *L'Humanité*.

25. A delegation of the International Union of Students led by its President Miroslav Stepan arrives in Vietnam on a visit.

— Comrade Kurt Brahman, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, offers the Vietnamese people all the money he was awarded as the Lenin International Prize "For the Consolidation of Peace among Nations".

26. Statement of the spokesman of the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs: All Beijing's schemes and tricks aimed at dividing the Southeast Asian countries will certainly fail.

27. The SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a statement reaffirming that the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes are Vietnamese territory.

— Prime Minister Pham Van Dong concludes his official friendship visit to the Republic of Iraq, begun on 24 September 1979. A joint Communiqué is published. An agreement on cultural cooperation between Vietnam and Iraq is signed.

— Signing in Hanoi of an agreement and minute on tourist co-operation between Vietnam and Laos.

— Signing in Hanoi of a consular agreement between Vietnam and Poland.

28. The Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam holds a press conference to introduce the White Book on Vietnam's sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes.

30. Closing of the Second Congress of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea. The Congress appointed a 35-member Central Committee headed by Heng Samrin.

OCTOBER

1. Beginning of the census throughout Vietnam.

— In Panama, Vietnam is the first country to sign the protocol on the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal.

2. The Party and State delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria led by Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concludes its official friendship visit to the SRV, begun on 29 September 1979. A joint communiqué and treaty of friendship and co-operation between Vietnam and Bulgaria, valid for 25 years, are signed.

3. The Government Council issues rules on signing and realizing economic contracts on production, material supply and consuming products of small industry and handicrafts.

— The Government Council gives instructions on policy to encourage the development of cattle breeding.

4. The SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds a press conference to publish the White Book on "The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations Over the Past 30 Years".

5. A Vietnamese Party and Government delegation led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, Political Bureau member of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, arrives in Berlin to attend the 30th National Day of the German Democratic Republic.

8. The Government Council gives instructions on developing industrial poultry breeding.

9. *Nhan Dan* publishes in full the Decision of the 6th session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam on the orientation and tasks of developing the consumer goods industry and local industry.

— Hanoi: Inauguration of the Vietnam-Poland third-level general education school.

11. Signing in Hanoi of a consular agreement between Vietnam and Hungary.

12. The Vietnamese ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania presents the national liberation movements in Africa with 4 tons of medicines.

— Signing in Ulan Bator of a protocol between Vietnam and Mongolia on goods exchange and payment in 1980.

13. A World Peace Council delegation led by its Chairman Romesh Chandra arrives in Vietnam on a visit.

15. Signing in Hanoi of documents on co-operation in agriculture, forestry and water conservancy between Vietnam and Laos.

— Signing in Beijing of a letter of exchange on the Danish Government's assistance to Vietnam to build a freezing plant and a factory recycling rubbish.

END OF

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